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Franchise Participants as Proper
Patent Opponents:
Walker Process Claims
Robert W. Emerson*
ABSTRACT

Franchiseparties may be sued for patent infringement, or they
may seek to sue others for an antitrust injury as the result of a
fraudulently obtained patent. Indeed, franchisors and franchisees may
simultaneously fall under both categories-sued for infringement but
aggrieved because the very basis of that suit is illegitimate in their eyes.
These franchiseparties may turn for relief to a patent-validitychallenge
authorized in the seminal case Walker Process Equipment, Inc. v. Food
Machine & Chemical Corp. Franchise participants-franchisees
and franchisors alike-may be the ideal Walker Process claimants.
When these types of cases occur, the damages within the franchise system
are fairly uniform, as the harm often relates to a core element of
franchising:licenses, shared by all parties to a franchise network.
One of the hallmarks of Walker Process claims is how loose the
standing requirements are. Both direct purchasers and indirect
purchasers of a patented device or process may bring a challenge based
on the patent holder's alleged fraud in obtaining the patent and
the resulting antitrust injuries. In the franchisingcontext, Ritz Camera
& Image, LLC v. SanDisk Corp. and its progeny provide franchisors,
franchise associations, and franchisees with procedures to protect
themselves and those they represent from patent trolling and sham
litigation. The Walker Process claim and its resulting principles and
practices may also have benefits beyond patent-law regimes for use in
other areas of value to licensors and licensees.

JD, Harvard Law School; BA, Sewanee: University of the South; Huber Hurst
Professor of Business Law, University of Florida. Email: robert.emerson@warrington.ufl.edu. The
Author thanks annual conference attendees at the International Society of Franchising and the
Academy of Legal Studies in Business for their comments on drafts of this Article. Any errors are
solely the responsibility of the Author.
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I. INTRODUCTION

Defendants in patent-infringement actions may feel doubly
aggrieved. They declare their innocence of any infringing activities and
assert that it is, in fact, the plaintiff who has broken the law. If the
plaintiff is not directly contravening the defendants' own intellectual
property rights, then the theory is that, at the very least, the plaintiff
is violating antitrust law. Thus, when franchise relationships are
involved, both the franchisors and the franchisees may find themselves
aligned on the same side: sued by a third party for infringement,
challenging not only the suit's legitimacy but also the plaintiffs
anticompetitive actions supported by a fraudulently obtained
patent. Franchisor and franchisee alike may thus turn for relief to a
patent-validity challenge. Such a challenge, and its ramifications for
franchising and beyond, is the focus of this Article.
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A. A Serious Problem
In the United States, patent protection is only afforded to
inventors of new and useful articles of manufacture, processes,
machinery, or other such subject matter.' Certainly, many persons who
consider themselves deserving of a patent will be denied. 2 Even if
something is patentable, a patent may still be unenforceable based on
improprieties that occurred in the procurement of that patent. So,
imagine the surprise of a business owner who, while selling products
that are ineligible for patent protection, is served with a summons and
complaint or receives a cease and desist letter from a competitor
alleging patent infringement. If the business owner could not procure a
patent on the product, certainly the competitor should not have been
able to do so either. Defending an infringement suit can be costly.
Defending a patent in the inter partes review process can also be
incredibly burdensome. 3 Both of these legal concerns may actually
constitute distractions resulting in loss of sales, premature exit from
the market, and precluded entry.4 As is often the case in such a scenario,
the competitor is seeking to enforce a patent that has been procuredby

1.
35 U.S.C. § 101 (2018) ("Whoever invents or discovers any new and useful process,
machine, manufacture, or composition of matter, or any new and useful improvement thereof, may
obtain a patent therefor, subject to the conditions and requirements of this title.").
2.
There are three common categories of patents: utility, design, and plant patents. The
invention patent, also known as a product patent, protects only the product. United States v. Gen.
Elec. Co., 82 F. Supp. 753, 814 (D.N.J. 1949) (quoting In re Amtorg Trading Corp., 75 F.2d 826,
832 (C.C.P.A. 1935)). The utility patent, sometimes termed a process patent, protects only the
process. Id. Patents will not be refused solely because an invention can be characterized as a
method of doing business. State St. Bank & Tr. Co. v. Signature Fin. Grp., Inc., 149 F.3d 1368,
1370, 1376 (Fed. Cir. 1998), abrogated by In re Bilski, 545 F.3d 943 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (considering a
patent for a "Data Processing System for Hub and Spoke Financial Services Configuration"). For
other examples of courts considering business-method patents, see DDR Holdings, LLC v.
Hotels.com, L.P., 773 F.3d 1245, 1257-58 (Fed. Cir. 2014) (discussing patent for method of
providing a host website with transparent, context-sensitive, e-commerce-supported
advertisements); Ultramercial, Inc. v. Hulu, LLC, 772 F.3d 709, 712 (Fed. Cir. 2014) (involving a
patent for monetizing and distributing copyrighted products on the internet). For instance, in
Bilski u. Kappos, the Supreme Court refused to invalidate a method of hedging risk in a
commodities-trading patent simply because it involved a business method. 561 U.S. 593, 606-07
(2010) (holding that the application of the machine-or-transformation test as the sole test for
deciding the patent eligibility of a "process" violated statutory principles).
3.
Any person other than the patent owner can request an inter partes review. 35
U.S.C. § 311(a) (2018). The petition can request cancellation of one or multiple patents on the
grounds that the patented claim fails the novelty or nonobviousness standards for patentability,
but the challenges must be made "only on the basis of prior art consisting of patents or printed
publications." Oil States Energy Sers., LLC v. Greene's Energy Grp., LLC, 138 S. Ct. 1365, 1371
(2018).
4.
Herbert J. Hovenkamp, The Walker Process Doctrine: Infringement Lawsuits as
Antitrust Violations (Univ. of Iowa Legal Studies Research Paper No. 08-36, Sept. 2008).
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fraud against the US Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO). That is
the subject of this Article, as alleged patent frauds are considered in the
franchise context.
Fortunately, there is a remedy for the business owner in the
above example: a Walker Process claim. 5 This claim can be used either
offensively or defensively against the competitor for engaging in
monopolizing conduct violative of the Sherman Antitrust Act. 6
The Walker Process claim is typically used as a counterclaim to
a patent-infringement suit, in which the alleged patent infringer
(1) invokes antitrust law to allege that the patent holder wrongly
attempted to monopolize a market, and (2) "seek[s] a declaratory
judgment that the patent is invalid because its owner defrauded the
[USPTO]."7 Although this antitrust lawsuit typically arises as a

counterclaim to an infringement lawsuit, a Walker Process claim can
also be brought in declaratory judgment actions or in primary lawsuits
filed under the Sherman Act.8

When a Walker Process claim is pursued defensively as a
counterclaim, the patentee is usually asserting its rights under a patent
based on certain identified activities of the defendant, where that
defendant contends that it has the right to engage in the accused
activity without a license.9 When a Walker Process claim is brought
offensively, the plaintiff claims that it lost customers because the patent
holder threatened patent litigation on the basis of fraudulently
procured patents. 10
Whether utilizing a Walker Process claim offensively or
defensively, a litigant can choose to engage in a traditional lawsuit or
the inter partes review process, whereby the USPTO reviews the
validity of the already-issued patent." If the litigant petitions for inter

5.
Walker Process Equip., Inc. v. Food Mach. & Chem. Corp., 382 U.S. 172 (1965).
6.
Sherman Antitrust Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-7 (2018).
7.
Walker Process Claim, BLACKS LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014) (citing Walker
Process Equip., 382 U.S. 172).
8.
Hovenkamp, supranote 4, at 30, 33-34.
9.
See Dippin' Dots, Inc. v. Mosey, 476 F.3d 1337, 1341 (Fed. Cir. 2007); Nobelpharma
AB v. Implant Innovations, Inc., 141 F.3d 1059, 1067 (Fed. Cir. 1998); Cabinet Vision v.
Cabnetware, 129 F.3d 595, 597 (Fed. Cir. 1997).
10.
See Hydril Co. v. Grant Prideco LP, 474 F.3d 1344, 1350 (Fed. Cir. 2007) (holding that
a plaintiff may bring a claim without waiting to be sued on the patent if there are "[t]hreats of
patent litigation against customers, based on a fraudulently-procured patent, with a reasonable
likelihood that such threats will cause the customers to cease dealing with their supplier");
Cornucopia Prods., LLC v. Dyson, Inc., 881 F. Supp. 2d 1086 (D. Ariz. 2012) (affirming an offensive
Walker Process claim based on threats of litigation by manufacturer to retailers of bladeless fans).
11.
Oil States Energy Sers., LLC v. Greene's Energy Grp., LLC, 138 S. Ct. 1365, 1370
(2018); supra note 3.
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partes review, it can move the court to stay litigation until the USPTO
issues a ruling on the patent's validity. 12 Indeed, this review process has
been dubbed the patent "death squad" for its role in aiding businesses,
particularly large tech companies such as Apple Inc. and Alphabet Inc.
(the parent company of Google and several former Google subsidiaries),
to invalidate hundreds of issued patents. 13 If a party believes the
USPTO has exceeded its statutory bounds or incompetently reviewed a
petition, judicial review remains available for the aggrieved party and
allows courts to set aside USPTO actions that are "not in accordance
with law" or are "in excess of statutory jurisdiction, authority, or
limitations."14
B. This Article's Scope
This Article commences, in Part II, by reviewing the scope of the
Walker Process claim and its antitrust injury requirements, while also
detailing the common barriers and obstacles in consumers' and
competitors' ability to bring Walker Process claims. This Part also
distinguishes Walker Process claims from "sham litigation." Next, Part
III discusses the standing requirements of Walker Process claims. Part
IV then evaluates how patent-infringement challenges may arise in the
franchising context and thereby imperil franchise systems. After
establishing this context, Part V next examines the consequences of the
Ritz Camera decision 15 and argues that franchisors and franchisees
should be considered "proper plaintiffs" for Walker Process claims. Part
VI then demonstrates how many of the obstacles and barriers facing
other Walker Process litigants are not issues for franchisors. Indeed, one
could argue that Walker Process claims are better suited for franchisors

12.
35 U.S.C. § 315(a)(2) (2018). The Supreme Court recently strengthened, in effect, the
government's power to annul or set aside a patent. In Oil States Energy Services, the Court stated,
the public-rights doctrine, which permits adjudication of public rights by entities other than Article
III courts, "applies to matters 'arising between the government and others, which from their
nature do not require judicial determination and yet are susceptible of it."' 138 S. Ct. at 1373
(quoting Crowell v. Benson, 285 U.S. 22 (1932)). The Court held that the inter partes review of a
patent by the Patent Trial and Appeal Board falls squarely within the public-rights doctrine, and
thus the USPTO can conduct inter partes review without violating Article III. Id.
13.
Greg Stohr & Susan Decker, Patent Death Squad' System Upheld by U.S. Supreme
Court, BLOOMBERG (Apr. 24, 2018, 4:25 PM), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2018-0424/patent-death-squad-system-upheld-by-u-s-supreme-court [https://perma.cc/BUD5-5HPG]. This
can also be an advantageous avenue for a claimed infringer to challenge a patent's validity because
the petitioner in this process only has the burden of proving unpatentability by a preponderance
of the evidence, a lower standard than the Walker Process's "clear and convincing" standard. 35
U.S.C. § 316(e); Oil States Energy Serus., 138 S. Ct. at 1379.
14.
SAS Inst. Inc. v. Iancu, 138 S. Ct. 1348, 1359 (2018).
15.
Ritz Camera & Image, LLC v. SanDisk Corp., 700 F.3d 503 (Fed. Cir. 2012).
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and franchisees than for the other types of patent infringers with whom
it is more commonly associated. Finally, Part VII, the Conclusion,
reviews how franchise participants-particularly franchisors-are
ideal plaintiffs for Walker Process claims. Franchise participants can
best protect the franchise system and, indeed, should be empowered to
help combat patent trolling.
II. WALKER PROCESS CLAIMS
A Walker Process claim can be a counterclaim to a
patent-infringement suit. However, given the expansive case law since
the concept was first coined, it also encompasses any other claim-by
any party (e.g., a defendant or a plaintiff) alleging that an opposing
party fraudulently procured its patent. The claim gets its name from
the 1965 US Supreme Court case, Walker Process Equipment, Inc. u.
Food Machinery & Chemical Corp.16
Food Machinery filed suit against Walker Process for
infringement of Food Machinery's patent that covered knee-action
swing diffusers used in aeration equipment for sewage treatment
systems. 1 7 Walker Process denied the infringement and eventually
counterclaimed that Food Machinery "illegally monopolized interstate
and foreign commerce by fraudulently and in bad faith obtaining and
maintaining .

.

. its

patent."18

The

district

court

dismissed

the

infringement complaint along with the counterclaim, finding that
Walker Process attempted to use the issue of fraud to procure indirectly
a cancellation of the patent via the lawsuit.19 The court reasoned that
"only the government may 'annul or set aside' a patent." 20
The US Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit affirmed the
district court's decision. 21 Both courts concluded that proof of fraudulent
procurement may be used to bar recovery based on infringement, but
not to establish patent invalidity. 22 On appeal, however, the US
Supreme Court held that Walker Process's action was "not barred by
the rule that only the United States may sue to cancel or annul a
patent." 2 3 The Supreme Court instead acknowledged that "a person

16.
Walker Process Equip., Inc. v. Food Mach. & Chem. Corp., 382 U.S. 172 (1965).
Id. at 173.
17.
18.
Id. at 173-74.
19.
Food Mach. & Chem. Corp. v. Walker Process Equip., Inc., 335 F.2d 315, 316 (7th Cir.
1964), reu'd, 382 U.S. 172 (1965) (describing the trial court's actions).
20.
Walker Process, 382 U.S. at 175 (citing Mowry v. Whitney, 81 U.S. 434, 441 (1871)).
21.
Food Mach., 335 F.2d at 317.
22.
Walker Process, 382 U.S. at 175.
23.
Id.
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sued for infringement may challenge the validity of the patent on

various grounds, including fraudulent procurement," 24 the Declaratory
Judgment Act, 25 and the misuse of patent rights. 26 The Court concluded
that enforcement of a patent procured by fraud against the USPTO may
violate section 2 of the Sherman Act if the other elements needed for a
case under that section are present. 27 In that instance, the treble
damages provisions of section 4 of the Clayton Act would be available
to an injured party. 28
Whether a Walker Process claim is a permissive counterclaim or
a compulsive counterclaim, which would bar an alleged patent infringer
from raising the Walker Process claim in a subsequent suit, is highly
debatable. In Mercoid Corp. v. Mid-Continent Investment Co., 29 the US
Supreme Court held that the plaintiff was not barred from bringing a
subsequent suit based on misuse of a patent despite the fact that the
plaintiff failed to raise this as a counterclaim in the previous
infringement suit.30 However, a subsequent case has muddied the
waters on this topic by interpreting this holding as narrowly applying
solely to claims of patent misuse. The Second Circuit has held that
counterclaims based on patent invalidity are, in contrast, compulsory
counterclaims. 31 Therefore, case law on the topic does not provide a
clear answer.
24.
Id. at 176. "Fraudulent procurement," also termed "fraud in the inducement," occurs
when a misrepresentation leads another to enter into a transaction with a false impression of the
risks, duties, or obligations involved." Fraudin the Inducement, BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY (10th
ed. 2014). It is "an intentional misrepresentation of a material risk or duty." Id.
25.
28 U.S.C. § 2201 (2018).
26.
Walker Process, 382 U.S. at 176.
27.
Section 2 of the Sherman Act prohibits monopolization, attempts to monopolize, and
conspiracies to monopolize. 15 U.S.C. § 2 (2018); Walker Process, 382 U.S. at 174.
28.
Walker Process, 382 U.S. at 174.
Except as provided in subsection (b), any person who shall be injured in his business or
property by reason of anything forbidden in the antitrust laws may sue therefor in any
district court of the United States in the district in which the defendant resides or is
found or has an agent, without respect to the amount in controversy, and shall recover
threefold the damages by him sustained, and the cost of suit, including a reasonable
attorney's fee.
Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. § 15 (2018).
29.
Mercoid Corp. v. Mid-Continent Inv. Co., 320 U.S. 661 (1944).
Id. at 671.
30.
31.
See Critical-Vac Filtration Corp. v. Minuteman Int'l, Inc., 233 F.3d 697, 704 (2d Cir.
2000); Eon Labs., Inc. v. SmithKline Beecham Corp., 298 F. Supp. 2d 175, 181 (D. Mass. 2003)
(adopting the distinction between patent misuse and invalidity articulated in Critical-Val for
antitrust claims). But see Tank Insulation Int'l, Inc. v. Insultherm, Inc., 104 F.3d 83, 88 (5th Cir.
1997) (holding that antitrust claims were permissive counterclaims in an infringement action);
Hydranautics v. Filmtec Corp., 70 F.3d 533, 536 (9th Cir. 1995) (holding that antitrust claims were
permissive counterclaims in an infringement action); P&M Servs. v. Gubb, No. 07-12816, 2008
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A. The Elements of Walker Process Claims
In order to bring a Walker Process claim, a purported patent
infringer must prove two elements: (1) the patent was obtained through
fraud upon the USPTO, and (2) the fraudulently obtained patent was
used to restrain competition. 32
1. The First Element of Walker Process Claims: Fraud
The first element for a Walker Process claim is fraud. This is, of
course, a basic common law concept hard to prove in court. 33 Giuliano
v. SanDisk LLC is an example of courts interpreting the fraud
element, 34 with the hardest component of fraud to establish being
intent. The battle is not over, however, until a claimant proves all
components-falsity, intent, justifiable reliance, and that without "the
misrepresentation or deliberate omission the patent would not have
been granted." 35 So, much of what parties need to show before pursuing
a Walker Process claim is what the presumed patent infringer would
later need to introduce in court to defeat a Walker Process claim. 36
The first element of the Walker Process claim is controlled by
federal laW 37 and requires proof of the elements of fraud as developed
in the common law. 38 Today, fraud in patent procurement is usually in

the form of inequitable conduct in the application process for the

U.S. Dist. LEXIS 67976, at *13 (E.D. Mich. Sept. 8, 2008), affd, 372 F. App'x 613 (6th Cir. 2010)
(rejecting the distinction between patent misuse and invalidity articulated in Critical-Val for
antitrust claims).
32.
Walker Process, 382 U.S. at 179 (Harlan, J., concurring).
33.
The common-law elements of fraud are "(1) that a false representation of a material
fact was made, (2) with the intent to deceive, (3) which induced the deceived party to act in
justifiable reliance on the misrepresentation, and (4) which caused injury that would not otherwise
have occurred." C.R. Bard, Inc. v. M3 Sys., Inc., 157 F.3d 1340, 1364 (Fed. Cir. 1998) (citing
Nobelpharma AB v. Implant Innovations, Inc., 141 F.3d 1059, 1069-70 (Fed. Cir. 1998)).
34.
Giuliano v. SanDisk LLC, 705 F. App'x 957, 960 (Fed. Cir. 2017). A Walker Process
claimant must present evidence sufficient to establish "clear and convincing evidence" that a
patentee obtained a patent through "actual fraud upon the [USPTO]." Id. This must evidence a
'clear intent to deceive the examiner and thereby cause the [USPTO] to grant an invalid patent."
Id.
35.
In re DDAVP Direct Purchaser Antitrust Litig., 585 F.3d 677, 685 (2d Cir. 2009); C.R.
Bard, 157 F.3d at 1364.
36.
King Drug Co. of Florence v. Cephalon, Inc., Nos. 2:06-cv-1797, 2:06-cv-1833,
2:06-cv-2768, 2:08-cv-2141, 2014 WL 982848, at *63 (E.D. Pa. Mar. 13, 2014).
37.
Dippin' Dots, Inc. v. Mosey, 476 F.3d 1337, 1346 (Fed. Cir. 2007) (citing Nobelpharma
AB, 141 F.3d at 1068); Nobelpharma AB, 141 F.3d at 1068 (holding that whether conduct in
procuring or enforcing a patent is sufficient to strip a patentee of its immunity from the antitrust
laws is to be decided as a question of Federal Circuit law).
38.
C.R. Bard, 157 F.3d at 1364.
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patent. 39 The defense of inequitable conduct has been described as "the
primary doctrinal safeguard against patentee dishonesty." 40 However,
the Federal Circuit has set a particularly high standard for proving
fraud by requiring both intent and materiality.4 1 Applied to the context
of a party's pursuit of a patent, fraud requires:
(1)

a false representation or deliberate omission of a fact material to patentability,

(2) made with the intent to deceive the patent examiner,
(3) on which the examiner justifiably relied [when] granting the patent, [and]
(4) but for [the] misrepresentation or deliberate omission the patent would not have
been granted. 42

Given the high burden placed on plaintiffs, it is perhaps unsurprising
that in the vast majority of cases, summary judgment is granted to
Walker Process defendants. 43
The second prong of the fraud element-the
intent
requirement-is the most difficult to prove in a Walker Process claim.
While there is no requirement that the intent to deceive must be shown
by direct evidence, in the absence of such direct evidence, an intent to
deceive must be proven by clear and convincing evidence to be the
"single most reasonable inference able to be drawn from the
circumstantial evidence."44 Examples of such fraud include omitting
prior art known to the patent applicant as shown in the applicant's
numerous, personal demonstrations of that art;4 5 deleting the

39.
Hovenkamp, supranote 4, at 2.
40.
Tun-Jen Chiang, The Upside-Down Inequitable Conduct Defense, 107 Nw. U. L. REV.
1243, 1295 (2013).
41.
See Therasense, Inc. v. Becton, Dickinson & Co., 649 F.3d 1276, 1291, 1296 (Fed. Cir.
2011) (adopting a "but-for" standard for materiality and a "knowing and deliberate" standard for
intent).
42.
In re DDAVP Direct Purchaser Antitrust Litig., 585 F.3d 677, 685 (2d Cir. 2009); C.R.
Bard, 157 F.3d at 1364.
43.
See SanDisk Corp. v. STMicroelectronics, Inc., No. C 04-4379 JF (RS), 2008 WL
4615605, at *7 (N.D. Cal. Oct. 17, 2008) ("This intent requirement is a high bar that often results
in adjudication in favor of the Walker Process defendant at summary judgment."); see, e.g.,
Chamberlain Grp., Inc.v. Techtronic Indus. Co., No. 1:16-cv-06097, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 129031,
at *28 (N.D. Ill. Aug. 14, 2017) (granting summary judgment to the plaintiff because the
defendant-patent infringer failed to establish fraud by the patent holder); Fuji Photo Film Co. v.
Jazz Photo Corp., 173 F. Supp. 2d 268, 276 (D.N.J. 2001) (granting summary judgment to the
plaintiff because a patent infringer failed to prove the plaintiff patent holder's fraud by clear and
convincing evidence).
44.
Therasense, 649 F.3d at 1290-91. This legal standard was followed in other cases as
well. Star Sci., Inc. v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 537 F.3d 1357, 1366 (Fed. Cir. 2008); Scanner
Techs. Corp. v. ICOS Vision Sys. Corp. N.V., 528 F.3d 1365, 1374-77 (Fed. Cir. 2008).
45.
Unitherm Food Sys., Inc. v. Swift-Eckrich, Inc., 375 F.3d 1341, 1360-61 (Fed. Cir.
2004), reu'd on other grounds, 546 U.S. 394 (2006).
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references to on-point prior art from its patent application without any
adequate explanation;4 6 and failing to provide the full translation of a
foreign patent that "was the only document in the initial application
that, if fully understood by the patent examiner, would have resulted in
a denial of that application."4 7 These and other case holdings show that
only a false or clearly misleading statement or omission can permit an
inference of deceptive intent.4 8
Without the intent to deceive, a Walker Process claim will not
survive,4 9 and it can be extremely difficult to prove in hindsight that a
party intentionally tried to deceive the USPTO. Illustratively, SanDisk,
the patent holder in Ritz Camera,50 had a Walker Process claim against
it regarding the NAND flash memory, but the US District Court for the
Northern District of California granted summary judgment for SanDisk
because the plaintiff could not show SanDisk had misrepresented
material facts to the USPTO with an intent to deceive. 51 The court
reached this conclusion despite the fact that the plaintiff offered strong
evidence that SanDisk had some knowledge of prior art that would
preclude patentability. The plaintiff demonstrated that SanDisk had
entered the prior art specifically into a prior art database and had cited
this prior art during the prosecution of a relevant patent. 52

46.
Nobelpharma AB v. Implant Innovations, Inc., 141 F.3d 1059, 1062, 1072 (Fed. Cir.
1998).
47.
Kaiser Found. Health Plan, Inc. v. Abbott Labs., Inc., 552 F.3d 1033, 1051 (9th Cir.
2009).
48.
See, e.g., Brasseler, U.S.A. I., L.P. v. Stryker Sales Corp., 267 F.3d 1370, 1383-85 (Fed.
Cir. 2001) (holding that knowingly failing to disclose prior art to the USPTO demonstrated an
intent to mislead); Molins PLC v. Textron, Inc., 48 F.3d 1172, 1181-82 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (holding
that knowingly failing to disclose prior art allowed for an inference of an intent to deceive the
USPTO); Paragon Podiatry Lab., Inc. v. KLM Labs., Inc., 984 F.2d 1182, 1192 (Fed. Cir. 1993)
(upholding the trial court's finding that the patentee knowingly submitting deceptive affidavits to
the USPTO in order to procure the patent constituted intentionally inequitable conduct).
49.
See, e.g., Leviton Mfg. Co. v. Universal Sec. Instruments, Inc., 606 F.3d 1353, 1364
(Fed. Cir. 2010) (vacating summary judgment because material issues of facts remained regarding
intent); Sentex Sys., Inc. v. Elite Access Sys., Inc., Nos. 98-1462, 98-1572, 2000 U.S. App. LEXIS
13560, at *5 (Fed. Cir. June 9, 2000) (stating that intent to mislead the USPTO cannot be solely
inferred from a failure to disclose material prior art when the patentee did not know of it);
Nordberg, Inc. v. Telsmith, Inc., 82 F.3d 394, 396-97 (Fed. Cir. 1996) (finding that the patent
holder did not conceal prior art references with intent to deceive the USPTO because there was no
evidence that the patent holder actually knew of the prior art).
50.
See discussion infra Part III.
51.
Giuliano v. SanDisk Corp., 224 F. Supp. 3d 851, 871 (N.D. Cal. 2016), aff'd sub nom.
Giuliano v. SanDisk LLC, 705 F. App'x 957, 960 (Fed. Cir. 2017). Without the intent to deceive, a
Walker Process claim simply will not survive. See, e.g., Nordberg, 82 F.3d at 396-97 (finding that
the patent holder did not conceal prior art references with intent to deceive the USPTO because
there was no evidence that the patent holder actually knew of the prior art).
52.
Giuliano, 705 F. App'x at 959-60.
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If this evidence is insufficient to survive summary judgment,
then the burden to establish intent to deceive must be extremely high.
In fact, the above case indirectly supports the notions that a
misrepresentation in the form of an omission is more likely to be
considered innocent and that an omission alone cannot support Walker
Process fraud without "evidence of intent separable from the simple fact
of the omission." 53 But is not an omission itself often formidable
evidence of an intent to deceive? Patent challengers will likely be
hard-pressed to discover clearer evidence of such an intent.54
The fourth prong of the fraud element-the causal connection
between the misrepresentation and the issuance of the patent-is also
especially confounding. It would be hard to prove that the USPTO
would have denied the patent but for the misrepresentation. As the last
element, causation serves as the core component in proving fraud upon
the USPTO and, ultimately, the invalidity of a disputed patent. It is a
crucial step for every Walker Process claim. 5 5 If instead a patent is found

to be valid even after finding that it was procured by deceit or omission,
then the patent clearly is not deemed harmful for society. That is
because the outcome-the initial determination to grant the patent-is
the same regardless of whether deceit was involved.5 6 Thus, if a
claimant cannot prove the direct causal connection between the
misrepresentation and the issuance of the patent, the claim becomes
moot.57

53.
Dippin' Dots, Inc. v. Mosey, 476 F.3d 1337, 1347 (Fed. Cir. 2007).
54.
See Hovenkamp, supra note 4, at 22. While a grave omission, by itself, ordinarily
should be evidence of an intent to deceive, certainly internal memoranda or statements directly
referring to, or even indirectly alluding to, the company's intent to deceive the USPTO with
omissions during the patent prosecution process would be even stronger evidence.
55.
See supra notes 41-43 and accompanying text (discussing the elements of fraud and
the Walker Process claim).
56.
See In re DDAVP Direct Purchaser Antitrust Litig., 585 F.3d 677, 690 (2d Cir. 2009)
("If a patent is valid, a Walker Process claim cannot stand."); King Drug Co. of Florence v.
Cephalon, Inc., Nos. 2:06-cv- 1797, 2:06-cv-1833, 2:06-cv-2768, 2:08-cv-2141, 2014 WL 982848, at
*60 (E.D. Pa. Mar. 13, 2014) ("The reason that invalidity is necessary for a Walker Process claim
is that a valid patent, even if procured by outright lies or thievery, does not harm consumers,
because they face the same circumstances that they would have even if the misconduct had not
occurred."); In re Ciprofloxacin Hydrochloride Antitrust Litig., 363 F. Supp. 2d 514, 546 n.28
(E.D.N.Y. 2005) (stating that a patent must be invalid before it can be a candidate for Walker
Process fraud).
57.
Of course, proving the fourth prong (that but for the misrepresentation or omission
the patent would not have been issued) may not be as difficult as proving the second prong (intent).
One may just look at whether the misrepresentation or omission was a material fact that the
USPTO looked at when granting patentability; this should be on the record. See SanDisk Corp. v.
STMicroelectronics, Inc., No. C 04-4379 JF (RS), 2008 WL 4615605, at *6 (N.D. Cal. Oct. 17, 2008);
supra notes 44-48 and accompanying text.
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Proving this connection becomes even more complicated if a
court requires that the same facts both establish the factual predicate
for patent invalidity and provide the basis for a presumed patent
infringer's Walker Process claim. 5 8 This means that a suspected
infringer, before bringing the claim, must dedicate resources
investigating and matching facts for patent invalidity and materiality
in order to bring a successful suit. With this seemingly higher burden
on the purported patent infringer-that he or she must, in effect, prove
all the elements of fraud to initiate a claim-the supposed infringer
certainly may be deterred from even initiating a Walker Process claim.
The requirements place a large burden on challenging parties, such as
franchisees, who likely do not have the resources to wage such a tough
uphill battle. Moreover, a Walker Process claim can arise several years
after a patent application is filed, further complicating the search for
clear and convincing evidence.5 9
2. The Second Element of Walker Process Claims: Antitrust Injury and
Anticompetitive Effect
The second element of a Walker Process claim is the antitrust
portion, which requires proof of monopolization,6 0 and it is controlled by
the case law of the circuit where the claim is brought. 61 This element
bleeds into the standing requirements for bringing a Walker Process
claim, which involve proving that an antitrust injury occurred 62 and

58.
King Drug, 2014 WL 982848, at *63.
59.
Herbert Hovenkamp, Competition for Innovation, 2012 COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 799, 828
(2012). The US Supreme Court has broadly declared that patent invalidity defenses must be
proven by "clear and convincing evidence." Microsoft Corp. v. i4i Ltd. P'ship, 564 U.S. 91, 95 (2011).
However, it is far from clear whether challenges not on the law but as to the facts-i.e., in a
postgrant challenge to the factual basis for that patent-must be proven by "clear and convincing"
evidence. See Nautilus, Inc. v. Biosig Instruments, Inc., 572 U.S. 898, 901, 912 n.10 (2014)
(noting-while holding that a patent application had failed to meet the statutory definiteness
standard and ruling to invalidate the patent-that the Court was not deciding "whether factual
findings subsidiary to the ultimate issue of definiteness trigger the clear-and-convincing-evidence
standard and, relatedly, whether deference is due to the PTO's resolution of disputed issues of
fact").
60.
Supra note 32 and accompanying text (explaining that the first of the two elements is
"fraud upon the USPTO").
61.
Unitherm Food Sys., Inc. v. Swift-Eckrich, Inc., 375 F.3d 1341, 1363 (Fed. Cir. 2004),
rev'd on other grounds, 546 U.S. 394 (2006); Carpenter Tech. Corp. v. Allegheny Techs. Inc., No.
08-2907, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 112556, at *18 (E.D. Pa. Sept. 29, 2011); Jersey Asparagus Farms,
Inc. v. Rutgers Univ., 803 F. Supp. 2d 295, 306 (D.N.J. 2011) (stating that the claimant "must also
show the basic elements of an antitrust violation defined by the regional circuit's law").
62.
An antitrust injury is an "injury of the type the antitrust laws were intended to
prevent and that flows from that which makes defendants' acts unlawful." Brunswick Corp. v.
Pueblo Bowl-O-Mat, Inc., 429 U.S. 477, 477, 489 (1977).
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that the injury reflects the anticompetitive effect. That effect is
manifested in either the violation itself or the anticompetitive acts
made possible by the violation. 63
B. PursuingWalker Process Claims and Battling Sham Litigation
Walker Process claims and sham litigation both contain
antitrust causes of action, but only sham litigation involves a baseless
suit. Sham litigation is about the enforcement of a patent that the
patentee knows is invalid or that the defendant has not infringed
upon.64 A patent holder can use manipulative licensing, settlements,
and threats of litigation to get its way against competitors while taking
care not to sign away too many rights.
Since the Sherman Act evaluates whether conduct unreasonably
harms competition and whether conduct monopolizes the market, often
Walker Process claims can be confused with simple sham litigation
claims inasmuch as both claims require similar proof.65 Nonetheless,
these two types of claims are distinct. A Walker Process action involves
first proving that the challenged patent was obtained through fraud on
the USPTO and, second, meeting the requirements for bringing a claim
under section 2 of the Sherman Act-more often than not on an
"attempt-to-monopolize" theory. 66 On the other hand, sham litigation
claims focus on the enforcement rather than the procurement of the
patent, such as where the patentee seeks to enforce in bad faith a patent
it knows to be invalid or not infringed upon by the plaintiff.67 Sham
litigation claims require proof that the infringement suit was
objectively baseless at the time of filing.68 When this is satisfied, the

63.
Id. at 489; see Atl. Richfield Co. v. USA Petrol. Co., 495 U.S. 328, 334, 344 (1990) (" [An]
injury, although causally related to an antitrust violation, nevertheless will not qualify as an
'antitrust injury' unless it is attributable to . . . . a competition-reducing aspect or effect of the
defendant's behavior."); Cargill, Inc. v. Monfort of Colo., Inc., 479 U.S. 104, 122 (1986) (holding
that loss or damage caused solely by increased competition is not an antitrust injury). As shown
in Part VI, the second element for Walker Process claims and the standing requirement for
antitrust injury overlap one another and certainly influence each other.
64.
See Profl Real Estate Inv'rs, Inc. v. Columbia Pictures Indus., Inc., 508 U.S. 49, 60
(1993) (examining the issues in the patent enforcement context, including those related to sham
litigation).
David R. Steinman & Danielle S. Fitzpatrick, Antitrust Counterclaims in Patent
65.
Infringement Cases: A Guide to Walker Process and Sham-Litigation Claims, 10 TEX. INTELL.
PROP. L.J. 95, 99 (2001).
66.
Walker Process Equip., Inc. v. Food Mach. & Chem. Corp., 382 U.S. 172, 177, 179
(1965); Handgards, Inc. v. Ethicon, Inc., 601 F.2d 986, 993 (9th Cir. 1979).
67.
See Prof' Real Estate Inu'rs, 508 U.S. at 60.
Id. To prove an "attempt to monopolize," a party must demonstrate "the patentee's
68.
possession of exclusionary power within the relevant market"-that is, it is "necessary to appraise
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court will require proof that the suit was motivated by a subjective
intent to abuse the litigation process in order to interfere with the
business of a competitor. 69
Similarities in Walker Process and sham litigation actions
arise. Once an antitrust plaintiff has satisfied the first element of its
claim-either fraud on the USPTO (a Walker Process claim) or
the patent holder's filing of an objectively baseless suit (sham
litigation)-it must next prove an antitrust violation under either cause
of action. 70 Conversely, the inequitable conduct that is actionable in a
sham litigation claim does not always, or even usually, rise to the
unlawful and knowingly fraudulent behavior required to support a
Walker Process claim. For example, a patent holder who uses an invalid
patent (i.e., the patent is expired, too broadly interpreted, indefinitely
stated, etc.) to demand unreasonable patent licensing agreements and
who brings an action in bad faith for enforcement of such a patent may
be engaged in sham litigation, but this patent holder will not be liable
on a Walker Process claim unless the subject patent was fraudulently
procured from the USPTO.7 1
With both Walker Process and sham litigation claims available,
one would assume that competitors charged with patent infringement
or otherwise facing a patent holder's anticompetitive conduct would
readily be able to use the legal system and protect their interests.
However, patent holders often resort to two specific devices to prevent
a declaration of invalidity with respect to their patent: manipulative
licensing and settlements. Manipulative licensing occurs when a patent
holder forces its competitors into an unfavorable licensing arrangement
with merely the threat of a patent-infringement suit. These
arrangements commonly entail "unfair royalty rates, double-charging
of customers and manufacturers, mandatory cross-licenses, and
reservation of the right to condition licenses on the resolution of
litigation." 72 The legality of these licensing arrangements is governed

the exclusionary power of the illegal patent claim of the relevant market for the product involved."
See Handgards, 601 F.2d at 993 n. 13.
69.
See Steinman & Fitzpatrick, supra note 65, at 100. This requires a consideration of
the litigant's motivations behind filing suit and a showing of other characteristics of grave abuse,
such as being coupled with actions or effects external to the suit that are anticompetitive
themselves. See In re Burlington N., Inc., 822 F.2d 518, 528 (5th Cir. 1987).
70.
Claudette Espanol, The Federal Circuit: Jurisdictional Expansion into Antitrust
Issues Relating to Patent Enforcement, 2 SETON HALL CIR. REV. 307, 329 (2005) (discussing the
scope of sham litigation and Sherman Act claims).
Id. at 332.
71.
72.
Townshend v. Rockwell Int'l Corp., No. C99-0400SBA, 2000 WL 433505, at *7 (N.D.
Cal. Mar. 28, 2000); see, e.g., Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 283 U.S. 163, 172 (1931) (holding
that cross-license agreements between owners do not create an illegal monopoly); Engel Indus.,
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by contract law principles, and, therefore, these arrangements are
largely evaluated by state courts, unless raised in the context of patent
infringement or validity. 7 3 Even when evaluated by federal courts, these
unfavorable conditions may not be deemed anticompetitive conduct if
the licensee was fully aware of the licensing terms prior to acceptance
of the arrangement.7 4
Often, a patent holder threatens litigation for the sole purpose
of extracting licensing payments rather than out of any interest in
protecting patent rights.7 5 In other words, many patent disputes arise
through "legalized licensing extortion" rather than through attempts by
legitimate licensors to protect their technology, intellectual property, or
know-how. 76 Indeed, patent holders must take care not to license away
too many rights to their patents because courts may deem the patent
holders to have transferred away their own interest in their patents.
The Federal Circuit has concluded, "there is no single, exhaustive list
of rights a court must consider 'to determine whether a licensor has
transferred away sufficient rights to render an exclusive licensee the
owner of a patent."' 7 7 So, the legitimate patent holder-licensor must

tread carefully, asserting a significant residue of ownership interests
while still licensing rights to others. Trolls would appear to have fewer
such concerns, as their need to maintain a patent is mainly, if not
exclusively, to collect licensing fees, not necessarily to plan long-term
retention of and development of that patent in actual commerce, let
alone to use the patent for their own manufacturing, design, or other
productive purposes.

Inc. v. Lockformer Co., 96 F.3d 1398, 1402 (Fed. Cir. 1996) (the threat of an infringement suit
unless the licensee agreed to pay royalties for sales of patented and unpatented products);
Townshend, 2000 WL 433505, at *9 (dismissing, for failure to prove anticompetitive conduct, the
claim that a patent holder's licensing tactics rise to the level of patent misuse and antitrust
violation).
Robert J. McManus et al., Survey of Patent Law Decisions in the Federal Circuit: 1998
73.
in Review, 48 AM. U. L. REV. 1319, 1439 (1999).
74.
See Townshend, 2000 WL 433505, at *16.
75.
See generally Zeljko Tekic & Dragan Kukolj, Threat of Litigation and Patent Value:
What Technology Managers Should Know, RES.-TECH. MGMT., Mar.-Apr. 2013, at 18 (discussing
the enormous value of patents utilized by patent trolls or sharks in the growing high-technology
industry to acquire license payments).
76.
Eugene R. Quinn, Jr., Abusing Intellectual Property Rights in Cyberspace: Patent
Misuse Revisited, 28 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 955, 985-986 & 998 (2002) (evaluating whether
enforcement and licensing of patents without first conducting a prior art search should be
considered patent misuse).
77.
Mark J. Abate & Christopher J. Morten, Standing with a Bundle of Sticks: The All
Substantial Rights Doctrine in Action, 28 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 477, 489
(2018) (citing Alfred E. Mann Found. for Sci. Research v. Cochlear Corp., 604 F.3d 1354, 1360 (Fed.
Cir. 2010)).
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This extortion arises through entities that are in the business of
purchasing highly questionable patents, not for the purpose of
expanding the patented technology or for operational purposes but for
the purpose of obtaining payouts through protecting patent rights via
licensing.7 8 Potential infringers are likely to pursue licenses to avoid

costly infringement litigation and to prevent remedies, such as
injunctions, from shutting down production, which can be even more
costly for large manufacturing companies. 79
Even when a competitor does pursue legal action, the patent
holder is often able to exploit its patent rights and avoid exposure of its
fraudulent patent by negotiating a settlement with its competitor in
exchange for a voluntary dismissal of the competitor's Walker Process
claims. 8 0 This potential for abuse of the settlement process is especially

concerning in light of courts' strong preference for the settlement of
patent-infringement suits and refusal to evaluate the fairness of a
settlement even where monopolistic conduct is present.8 1 However, a
Second Circuit decision in 2009 held that a licensee can be liable for
consumer antitrust damages if it knew or had reason to know that a
patent's validity was at issue but did not perform an independent
investigation into the issue. 82 Hopefully, this potential liability will
reduce competitor acceptance of settlements that turn a blind eye to
invalid patents. Nevertheless, it is clear that granting consumers, as
well as franchise participants, Walker Process standing will reduce the
patent holder's ability to escape patent invalidity claims through
settlement.
The benefits of expanding consumers' Walker Process standing
may be negated by the fact that competitors will feel incentivized to
avoid litigation and instead settle. However, expanding Walker Process
standing for franchise participants also ensures that patent trolls
cannot weasel their way out of having their paltry, or even nonexistent,

78.
Quinn, supra note 76, at 985-986 & 985 n.121.
79.
See Bronwyn Hall & Rosemarie Ham Ziedonis, The Patent Paradox Revisited: An
Empirical Study of Patentingin the U.S. SemiconductorIndustry, 1979-1995, 32 RAND J. ECON.
101, 109 (2001) (discussing the aggressive licensing strategy in the US semiconductor industry
and the threat of litigation to procure licensing payments).
80.
Stijepko Tokic, Impact of Legal (Un)certainty on Patent Valuation: What Investors
Should Know Before Investing in Patents, 22 FED. CIR. B.J. 363, 389 (2013).
81.
Herbert Hovenkamp, Patents, Property, and Competition Policy, 34 J. CORP. L. 1243,
1251 (2009) (evaluating the uncertain boundaries of patent lawsuit settlements).
82.
In re DDAVP Direct Purchaser Antitrust Litig., 585 F.3d 677, 695 (2d Cir. 2009).
The patent holder's duty toward licensees is primarily, if not purely, contractual. The policy
ramifications could include placing a potentially large burden on licensees to conduct an
investigation, as in DDAVP Direct Purchaser; overly discouraging settlements; and placing
additional checks on monopolistic conduct.

2020]

FRANCHISE PARTICIPANTS AS PATENT OPPONENTS

523

patent rights exposed. 83 Indeed, even if patent holders try to avoid the
invalidation of their patents through settlement, franchise participants
still have the option of pursuing Walker Process claims. In this manner,
Walker Process claims and sham litigation claims can pack a powerful
one-two punch.

III. RITZ CAMERA AND THE ISSUE OF STANDING
To understand Walker Process claims in their current state, one
must first understand who has standing to bring such claims. For
licensing and distribution arrangements, such as franchising, the Ninth
Circuit in Ritz Camera & Image, LLC v. SanDisk Corp. has broadened
the standing to bring Walker Process claims. 8 4 The potential reach of
claims has shifted from longstanding jurisprudence (over fifty years old)
to more expansive, innovative case law. This new notion of enlarged
standing is at the heart of the Ritz Camera holding, and the profound
implications of Ritz Cameraon franchise participants is at the heart of
this Article.
In Ritz Camera, the Ninth Circuit held that direct purchasers
have standing to bring Walker Process claims against patent holders in
the same manner as competitors injured by anticompetitive conduct.8 5
The plaintiffs, direct purchasers of the patented NAND flash memory
product, 86 brought a Walker Process claim against the patent holder,

83.
Evidence abounds that patent assertion firms, sometimes termed "non-practicing
entities" (NPEs) rather than the unabashedly negative term "troll," frequently hold patents not
for productive use but just to threaten litigation and acquire license payments (i.e., to troll). In
2013, patent trolls cost the US economy about $30 billion annually. Mark A. Lemley & A. Douglas
Melamed, Missing the Forestfor the Trolls, 113 COLUM. L. REV. 2117, 2119 (2013). NPEs also tend
to succeed at litigation much more than entities that actually use their own patents; between 2013
and 2017, NPEs had a patent litigation median damage award of $14.8 million compared to $4.2
million for practicing entities. LANDAN ANSELL ET AL., PRICEWATERHOUSECOOPERS, 2018 PATENT

&

LITIGATION STUDY 9 (2018), https://www.ipwatchdog.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/09/2018-pwcpatent-litigation-study.pdf [https://perma.cc/6C5W-AQEH]. Also, note that there are hybrids of
both use and trolling, where the latter is effectively licensed to another entity. See Lemley
Melamed, supra, at 2121 (describing a patent troll offshoot, the patent privateer, which is a
business that makes products, presumably under its own patent(s), but also transfers one or more
patents to a troll to pursue litigation against the privateer's competitors).
84.
Ritz Camera & Image, LLC v. SanDisk Corp., 700 F.3d 503, 506 (Fed. Cir. 2012).
85.
Id. at 508.
A NAND flash
86.
stores data in a large array of cells where each cell holds one or more bits of data. In a
typical, [NAND] Flash device, a high voltage of 1.8V is applied to the control gate to
draw electrons from the substrate to tunnel through the gate oxide into a polysilicon
floating gate layer. To store one bit, two charge levels in the floating gate layer can be
stored to distinguish between a '1' and a '0'.

524

IAND. J. ENT. & TECH. L.

[Vol. 22:3:507

SanDisk, in the Northern District of California.8 7 The plaintiffs alleged
that SanDisk violated section 2 of the Sherman Act when it conspired
to monopolize and actually monopolized the market for NAND flash
memory products by fraudulently obtaining patents from the USPTO,
and then by using these patents to threaten competitors and
competitors' customers.8 8 SanDisk moved to have the claim dismissed,
arguing that direct purchasers did not have standing to pursue Walker
Process claims. 8 9 However, the district court found that the direct
purchasers did have standing to bring a Walker Process claim and noted
that "[t]he Supreme Court's decision in Walker Process places no
limitation on the class of plaintiffs eligible to bring a Walker Process
claim."9 0 On appeal, the Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court's
decision.9 1
The Ninth Circuit in Ritz Camera declined to restrict Walker
Process patent invalidity suits to antitrust actions. 92 Ritz Camera
suggests that Walker Process claims may serve as a bulwark to counter
"patent trolling"; 93 these claims provide an effective mechanism for use
by those "downstream" from a patent-infringement claim but
nevertheless injured by the enforcement of fraudulently obtained
patents.9'

What Is the NAND Flash?, TCND (June 3, 2015), https://tendkr.wixsite.com/tend/singlepost/2015/06/04/What-is-the-NAND-Flash- [https://perma.cc/V528-KDGA].
87.
Ritz Camera & Image, LLC v. SanDisk Corp., 772 F. Supp. 2d 1100, 1102 (N.D. Cal.
2011), aff'd, 700 F.3d 503 (Fed. Cir. 2012).
88.
Id.
89.
Id. at 1102-03. Prior to this ruling, "[n]either the Supreme Court nor the Ninth Circuit
[had] determined whether direct purchasers, such as Ritz, have standing to assert a Walker
Process claim." Id. at 1103.
Id. at 1105.
90.
91.
Ritz Camera & Image, 700 F.3d at 508.
92.
Id. at 507-08 ("Nothing in Walker Process supports SanDisk's argument that the rules
governing standing to bring patent validity challenges should be imported into an antitrust case
simply because one element of the antitrust cause of action requires proof of improper procurement
of a patent."). While the action seeks relief under the antitrust laws, it does not directly seek to
invalidate the patent. Id. at 508.
93.
Nonpracticing entities are often referred to as "patent trolls"-somebody who tries to
make money from a patent they are not using and have no intention of using in the future. Stijepko
Tokic, The Role of Consumers in Deterring Settlement Agreements Based on Invalid Patents: The
Case of Non-PracticingEntities, 2012 STAN. TECH. L. REV. 1, 3.
94.
James E. Abell III, Comment, Setting the Standard: A Fraud-Based Approach to
Antitrust Pleading in StandardDevelopment Organization Cases, 75 U. CHI. L. REV. 1601, 1629
(2008) ("In cases where a downstream manufacturer brings suit against a patent holder, the claims
could be used as leverage to extract favorable licensing terms."); see generally Christopher A.
Cotropia & James Gibson, The Upside of Intellectual Property's Downside, 57 UCLA L. REV. 921,
948 (2010) ("Each new patent becomes a barrier to any downstream innovation that wishes to
build upon the patented method.").
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This decision naturally implies that those injured by the
fraudulent enforcement of patents have broad standing to bring Walker
Process claims. Many courts have held in this manner, 95 though others
have disagreed.9 6 It is worth briefly noting that broad standing is not
limitless. For example, courts have denied standing for Walker Process
claims when the challenged patent was found valid in a separate
infringement proceeding9 7 or when the USPTO reviewed the patent and
determined its validity.9 8 Additionally, direct purchasers do not have

95.
See In re DDAVP Direct Purchaser Antitrust Litig., 585 F.3d 677, 691-92 (2d Cir.
2009) (holding that direct purchasers had standing to pursue their Walker Process claim despite
the fact that, as purchasers, they could not directly challenge the patent's validity); see also In re
Lipitor Antitrust Litig., No. 3:12-cv-2389, 2013 WL 4780496, at *17 (D.N.J. Sept. 5, 2013), reu'd,
868 F.3d 231 (3d Cir. 2017) (declining to categorically exclude direct purchasers from having
Walker Process standing); Hydril Co. v. Grant Prideco LP, 474 F.3d 1344, 1352 (Fed. Cir. 2007)
(refusing to apply the standing limitation on declaratory judgment actions challenging a patent's
validity to the context of a Walker Process claim); Oetiker v. Jurid Werke, G.m.b.H., 556 F.2d 1,
2-6 (D.C. Cir. 1977) (holding that a plaintiff could bring a Walker Process claim even after the
patent holder disclaimed his patent and thus mooted the patent invalidity issue).
96.
See In re Remeron Antitrust Litig., 335 F. Supp. 2d 522, 528-29 (D.N.J. 2004) (finding
that direct purchasers did not have standing to bring a Walker Process fraud claim because the
plaintiffs never had the patent enforced against them, were never threatened with such
enforcement, and were not in a position to manufacture a competing product); Indium Corp. of Am.
v. Semi-Alloys, Inc., 566 F. Supp. 1344, 1352-53 (N.D.N.Y. 1983) ("In this court's view, in order to
establish antitrust standing to assert a Walker Process claim, the plaintiff must at least be able to
allege facts that indicate that the patent holder has enforced, or has sought to enforce, or has
threatened to enforce its fraudulently obtained patent against the plaintiff itself."). However, the
DC district court, in ruling that direct purchasers could have Walker Process standing, expressly
rejected this ruling as unpersuasive, stating, "The court in In re Remeron, by comparison, did find
that a direct purchaser lacked standing to bring a Walker Process claim. However, the court offered
little justification for its holding." Molecular Diagnostics Labs. v. Hoffmann-La Roche Inc., 402 F.
Supp. 2d 276, 280 (D.D.C. 2005). Molecular Diagnosticslikewise distinguished Carrot Components
Corp. u. Thomas & Betts Corp., which rejected a Walker Process claim because the plaintiff could
not show that the patent holder sought to enforce the patent against the plaintiff. No. 85-5133,
1986 WL 84373, at *5 (D.N.J. Feb. 3, 1986).
See In re DDAVP, 585 F.3d at 691-92 (holding that purchaser plaintiffs may only
97.
'raise Walker Process claims for patents that are already unenforceable due to inequitable
conduct"); In re Tamoxifen Citrate Antitrust Litig., 466 F.3d 187, 204 (2d Cir. 2005), abrogatedby
FTC v. Actavis, Inc., 570 U.S. 136 (2013) (giving great deference to previous findings of validity
regardless of potential success of settled infringement claims); Kroger Co. v. Sanofi-Aventis, 701
F. Supp. 2d 938, 962-63 (S.D. Ohio 2010) (holding that purchasers of a patented drug did not have
standing to raise a Walker Process claim because the patent was successfully enforced against an
infringer). However, the reissuance of a patent by USPTO "does not bar a later finding that the
patent was originally procured by fraud." See In re Lipitor Antitrust Litig., 868 F.3d 231, 270 (3d
Cir. 2017) (citing Therasense, Inc. v. Becton, Dickinson & Co., 649 F.3d 1276, 1291, 1288 (Fed. Cir.
2011)).
Oil States Energy Sers., LLC v. Greene's Energy Grp., LLC, 138 S. Ct. 1365, 1368
98.
(2018).
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standing if the claim is based on a patent that the patent holder chose
not to enforce against the party bringing the claims.99
The wide availability of a Walker Process claim to fight patent
trolling makes that claim particularly suitable to the franchise context.
Franchisees or franchisors may be patent-infringement defendants, be
direct purchasers from a patent holder, or have similar antitrust
injuries to that of the plaintiff in Ritz Camera. For example, in Dippin'
Dots, Inc. v. Mosey, the patent holder and franchisor, Dippin' Dots, sued
for patent infringement a group of former franchisees that sold similar
ice cream products called "Frosty Bites."1 00 The former franchisees in
turn brought a Walker Process antitrust claim against Dippin' Dots,
contesting the validity of the Dippin' Dots patent by arguing that the
patent was procured through fraud on the USPTO. 101 The jury
ultimately found for the franchisees; however, the court of appeals,
although finding the patent invalid by virtue of inequitable conduct,
determined that Dippin' Dots' intent to deceive the USPTO was not
sufficiently established under the Sherman Act. 102
As was perhaps the case in Dippin'Dots, franchise participants
can be named as patent-infringement defendants for merely competing
in the marketplace. 1 03 Additionally, franchisees may be licensees
of intellectual property accused of patent infringement without
themselves being named as defendants. 104 It is likely that Ritz Camera's
extension of the Walker Process claim to direct purchasers extended
access to the claim to all franchise participants.

99.
See Cornucopia Prods., LLC v. Dyson, Inc., 881 F. Supp. 2d 1086, 1099 (D. Ariz. 2012)
(citing Arrowhead Indus. Water, Inc. v. Ecolochem, Inc., 846 F.2d 731, 736 (Fed. Cir. 1988),
overruled on other grounds by MedImmune, Inc. v. Genentech, Inc., 549 U.S. 118 (2007)); see also
In re DDAVP, 585 F.3d at 690.
100.
Dippin' Dots, Inc. v. Mosey, 602 F. Supp. 2d 777, 779 (N.D. Tex. 2009) (granting the
competitor-defendant an award of appellate attorneys' fees pursuant to 35 U.S.C. § 285).
101.
Dippin' Dots, Inc. v. Mosey, 476 F.3d 1337, 1346 (Fed. Cir. 2007).
102.
Id. at 1346-47 ("To demonstrate Walker Process fraud, a claimant must make higher
threshold showings of both materiality and intent than are required to show inequitable conduct.").
103.
Id. at 1340. This point is debatable with respect to the facts in Dippin' Dots. Not
enough facts are provided in the court opinion to verify the plaintiffs motive. Another plausible
reading is that the franchisees were named as defendants because Dippin' Dots genuinely believed
that franchisees were infringing on its patent.
104.
Cf. MedImmune, 549 U.S. at 137 (holding that licensees are not required to break or
terminate a license agreement before seeking a declaratory judgment in federal court that the
underlying patent is invalid, unenforceable, or not infringed upon, as far as Article III is
concerned); see, e.g., Transitron Elec. Corp. v. Hughes Aircraft Co., 649 F.2d 871 (1st Cir. 1981)
(evaluating a claim by a licensee seeking to escape payment of future royalties, or disgorgement of
previously paid royalties, as a breach of contract claim premised on fraudulent procurement of a
patent). For more on this point-how franchisee-licensees are likely to be affected by infringement
suits against their franchisor-see infra Part IV.
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IV. INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY IN THE FRANCHISE SETTING

Franchisors create a relationship with franchisees to license the
use of intellectual property. Intellectual property protection is a crucial
aspect of franchise network planning, as it comports with the
franchisors' desire to attract consumers and exclude competitors.
Franchisees must be careful when creating something while in a
franchisor-franchisee relationship because the franchisor may have a
right to that creation. 105
Franchising is an arrangement between a franchisor, a
developer of a system for conducting a particular business, and a
franchisee, another entity that uses that system in exchange for
compensation. 106 Typically, the franchise relationship is a long-term
contractual relationship in which the franchisor grants the franchisee
a right to use the franchisor's name and trademark and to sell the
franchisor's products or adopt its overall business plan in exchange
for royalties and other fees. 107 This arrangement is usually intended
to be elaborate, long-term, and, most importantly, governed by a
comprehensive franchise agreement.10 8 In return for their money and

105.
Robert W. Emerson, FranchiseGoodwill: Take a Sad Song and Make It Better, 46 U.
MICH. J.L. REFORM 349, 357, 357 nn.36-37 (2013).
106.
Franchising is "a business relationship based on contract law in which a franchised
business grants a franchisee the rights to use its trademarks and proprietary information in
exchange for royalties." Robert W. Emerson, Franchise Territories:A Community Standard, 45
WAKE FORESTL. REV. 779, 780 (2010). It has long been considered an elaborate, relational contract
which, for many franchise networks, centers around the franchised enterprise's overall business
format rather than simply a single product or service.
[Franchises are] a business form essentially consisting of an organization
(the franchisor) with a market-tested business package centered on a product or
service, entering into a continuing contractual relationship with franchisees, typically
self-financed and independently owner managed small firms, operating under the
franchisor's trade name to produce and/or market goods or services according to a
format specified by the franchisor.
James Curran & John Stanworth, Franchisingin the Modern Economy - Towards a Theoretical
Understanding, 2 INT'L SMALL Bus. J. 8, 11 (1983). For general information on the economics of
franchisor opportunism and sales maximization, see ROGER D. BLAIR & FRANCINE LAFONTAINE,
THE ECONOMICS OF FRANCHISING 214-18 (2005).

107.
Robert W. Emerson, Franchise Contract Interpretation:A Two-Standard Approach,
2013 MICH. ST. L. REV. 641, 646 (2013) [hereinafter Franchise ContractInterpretation];see also
Robert W. Emerson, Franchise Contracts and Territoriality: A French Comparison, 3
ENTREPRENEURIAL BUS. L.J. 315, 318-23 (2009) (discussing the similarities and differences in how
the United States and France define the "franchise relationship").
108.
Franchise Contract Interpretations, supra note 107, at 646; see also Robert W.
Emerson, Franchise Terminations: "Good Cause" Decoded, 51 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 103, 106
(2016) (explaining that a predominant approach under franchise law is to treat the franchise
relationship "the same as any other contractual relationship").
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hard work, business-format franchisees rightfully expect much from the
franchisor.1 0 9

Franchisees looking to argue violations of federal or state
antitrust laws, whether by their franchisor, fellow franchisees, or third
parties, 110 will likely point to the importance of antitrust law in this
nation as spelled out by the Court in United States v. Topco
Associates.1 1 1 The Court in that case stated:
Antitrust laws in general, and the Sherman Act in particular, are the Magna Carta
of free enterprise. They are as important to the preservation of economic freedom
and our free-enterprise system as the Bill of Rights is to the protection of our
fundamental personal freedoms. And the freedom guaranteed each and every
business, no matter how small, is the freedom to compete-to assert with vigor,
imagination, devotion, and ingenuity whatever economic muscle it can muster. 112

Under antitrust law, franchise relationships are analyzed
mostly in the same way as nonfranchise relationships. 113 Certain
collaborative activities involved in franchising have been successfully
challenged as unreasonable restraints of trade in violation of section 1
of the Sherman Act. 114 Likewise, similar to nonfranchise relationships,
109.
Robert W. Emerson & Uri Benoliel, Are Franchisees Well-Informed? Revisiting the
Debate over FranchiseRelationship Laws, 76 ALB. L. REV. 193, 203 (2013) (citing numerous sources
for the conclusion that " [i]ndividuals with no prior business ownership experience are attracted to
the franchise business format because it provides the franchisee with the following: 1) an
opportunity to join an already established business system; 2) site selection assistance; 3) initial
training; 4) ongoing training; and 5) detailed operational manuals"). As to franchisees' receiving
the franchisor's name and trademark, the right to sell a franchisor's products, and the right to
adopt the franchisor's business plan, see supra note 107 and accompanying text.
110.
See, e.g., Standard Oil Co. v. Fed. Trade Comm'n, 340 U.S. 231, 233-34, 248 (1951)
("The heart of our national economic policy long has been faith in the value of competition.");
Midwestern Waffles, Inc. v. Waffle House, Inc., 734 F.2d 705, 721 (11th Cir. 1984) ("The antitrust
laws are designed to protect the consumer interest in competition and courts recognize that giving
wide latitude to businesses in choosing methods of distribution and particular distributors
promotes competition."). But see Little Caesar Enters., Inc. v. Smith, 34 F. Supp. 2d 513, 518 n.2
(E.D. Mich. 1998) (concluding that if franchisor approval is required of any distributor of products
to the franchisee other than the franchisor itself, and if the franchisor has legitimate business
reasons for rejecting a proposed alternate distributor, then there is no antitrust violation, even if
the franchisor has a secondary desire not to face competition).
111.
United States v. Topco Assocs., Inc., 405 U.S. 596 (1972).
112.
Id. at 610.
113.
Id. at 609-10 (describing the problems that arise when courts interpret franchise
agreements in accordance with general contract-law principles).
114.
Barry M. Block & Matthew D. Ridings, Antitrust Conspiraciesin Franchise Systems
After American Needle, 30 FRANCHISE L.J. 216 (2011); see United States v. Gen. Motors Corp., 384
U.S. 127, 144-45 (1966) (holding that a franchisor and franchisees' agreement to not sell cars to
discount sellers was a conspiracy that violated section 1 of the Sherman Act); see also Quality
Mercury, Inc. v. Ford Motor Co., 542 F.2d 466, 472 (8th Cir. 1976) (holding that an agreement
between a franchisor and competing franchisee that gave the franchisee veto power over all
applications for other franchises in the area was a sufficient cause of action under section 1 of the
Sherman Act); Am. Motor Inns, Inc. v. Holiday Inns, Inc., 521 F.2d 1230, 1242 (3d Cir. 1975)
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franchises are subject to claims of illegal tying arrangements.1 1 5 Such
arrangements are agreements to sell a product on the condition that the
buyer buys a tied product or, at the very least, agrees not to purchase
that product from any other supplier.1 16 The seller can then "leverage
this market power to exclude other sellers of the tied product."1 17
However, individual franchisees do not have large market power and
usually are not considered to be at risk of committing antitrust
violations.1 18 Conversely, franchisors often have large market power
over both franchisees and prospective competitors.1 19 How this power is
exercised frequently relates to the intellectual property licensing and
use arrangement.
Franchisors license to franchisees intellectual property, such as
rights to trademarks, trade names, patents, and know-how to use for
the sale of goods or services. 120 Patents are not the most important
intellectual property concern for most franchisors and their franchisees;
at law and in practice, the key intellectual property concern in franchise
relationships is usually the system's trademark. 12 1 However, as
(finding that franchisor's actions in allowing other franchisees to effectively veto a new franchise's
entry into their territories violated section 1 of the Sherman Act).
115.
See Highland Capital, Inc. v. Franklin Nat'l Bank, 350 F.3d 558, 564-65 (6th Cir.
2003) (stating that while the Sherman Act does not explicitly prohibit tying arrangements, such
arrangements do violate the Sherman Act if they produce anticompetitive behavior).
116.
See Rick-Mik Enters. Inc. v. Equilon Enters., LLC, 532 F.3d 963, 971 (9th Cir. 2008);
Unijax, Inc. v. Champion Int'l, Inc., 683 F.2d 678, 684 (2d Cir. 1982).
117.
Cascade Health Sols. v. PeaceHealth, 515 F.3d 883, 912 (9th Cir. 2008).
118.
Block & Ridings, supra note 114, at 216. In fact, franchisees only seem to face
accusations of antitrust violations when acting jointly with other franchisees in a franchise system.
See, e.g., Big Apple BMW, Inc. v. BMW of N. Am., Inc., 974 F.2d 1358, 1364-65 (3d Cir. 1992)
(discussing an alleged conspiracy between BMW franchisee dealers to preclude a new potential
franchisee from joining the franchise); Am. Motor Inns, 521 F.2d at 1254 (holding that the
combined effect of franchisee action amounted to an anticompetitive conspiracy to preclude a new
potential franchisee application).
119.
See generally Warren S. Grimes, When Do FranchisorsHave Market Power? Antitrust
Remedies for Franchisor Opportunism, 65 ANTITRUST L.J. 105 (1996) (discussing franchisor
market power, especially over franchisees who are likely at a large negotiating disadvantage to
franchisors). But see Alan H. Silberman, The Myths of Franchise 'Market Power", 65 ANTITRUST
L.J. 181, 212-13 (1996) (arguing that franchisors' having desirable franchise packages does not in
itself imply market power).
120.
3 ROGER M. MILGRIM, MILGRIM ON TRADE SECRETS § 10.02 (2019); WORLD
INTELLECTUAL PROP. ORG., WIPO INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY HANDBOOK 99 (2d ed. 2004),

&

www.wipo.int/edocs/pubdocs/en/intproperty/489/wipo-pub_489.pdf [https://perma.cc/5KRJ-6A32]
[hereinafter WIPO Handbook].
121.
At law, the franchise is defined to include a trademark license. Robert W. Emerson
Steven A. Hollis, Bound by Bias? Franchisees'Cognitive
Biases, 13 OHIO ST. Bus. L.J. 1, 5-6 (2019)
(surveying the Federal Trade Commission rule on franchising and the statutory or judicially
adopted definitions of franchising found in the fifty states and finding that "[t]wo of the three
elements [of franchising]-the trademark and the mandatory fee- . . appear in all state law
definitions as well as the FTC definition"). Under the Lanham Act, the franchisor's "statutory duty
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intellectual property evolves, patent protection within the franchise
market has become increasingly important as franchisors seek to
monopolize certain processes and machines to exclude competitors. For
example, McDonald's currently owns a number of utility patents for
various inventions, such as an automated beverage system, a conveyor
belt assembly, and an automated grill. 122 A large McDonald's
competitor, Burger King, owns patents on an electric broiler, a
steam-generating assembly, a food-holding cabinet assembly, a wall
surface, an apparatus and method for blocking flame and spreading
heated gas from a broiler flue, and a method for providing wide-area
wireless communication coverage. 123 Outside of the food service
industry, Bandag Incorporated, a tire retreading franchisor, owns
numerous patents, including different tire-tread designs and methods
for bonding treads to tires. 124 These examples illustrate that franchisors
in virtually any type of franchise system may own patents.
In the franchisor-franchisee relationship, patents can also be
useful in situations where an implied license may arise. 125 This
situation occurs when a franchisee develops an idea or system for use
in the network; presumably, such an invention would be patentable,
triggering the issue of whether the franchisor has an implied right to
to enforce quality control underlies the existence and enforcement of quality and uniformity
standards in a franchise system[, with a corollary] of this duty [being] that the trademark owner
[typically, the franchisor] has a legal obligation to prevent the sale of unauthorized products under
the trademark." Lanham Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1051-1141 (2018); 1 W. MICHAEL GARNER, FRANCHISE
AND DISTRIBUTION LAW AND PRACTICE

§

7:5 (2019).

As for practice, the raison d'itre of the franchise is the trademark:
At the heart of every franchise agreement is a trademark license. In fact, the right to
use the trademarks-the brand name, logos, and designs-of the franchisor is often the
key reason why a person decides to enter into a franchise agreement with a large
national chain rather than build up his or her own business. The person is relying on
the already existing marketing success of the franchisor to increase the chance of
success of his or her new business.
Lars

S. Smith, Trademark Law, in FRANCHISING: CASES, MATERIALS, & PROBLEMS 27, 27

(Alexander M. Meiklejohn et al. eds., 2013).
122.
Craig J. Madson, Patent Misuse in Franchise Agreements: A Ripple on the
Waters of Franchise Law, 20 FRANCHISE L.J. 107 (2001); Patents Assigned to McDonald's
Corporation, JUSTIA: PATENTS,
https://patents.justia.com/assignee/mcdonald-s-corporation
[https://perma.cc/GNX6-XHX8] (last visited Mar. 25, 2020).
123.
Patents Assigned to Burger King Corporation,JUSTIA: PATENTS, https://patents.justia.com/assignee/burger-king-corporation [https://perma.cc/83SD-SVHQ] (last visited Mar. 23,
2020).
124.
Madson, supra note 122, at 107.
125.
David Gurnick, Intellectual Property in Franchising:A Survey of Today's Domestic
Issues, 20 OKLA. CITY U. L. REV. 347, 370-71 (1995); see also Eric J. Rogers, The Inexhaustible
Right to Exclude Reproduction Doctrine, 14 COLUM. SCI. & TECH. L. REV. 389, 457-58 (2013)
(discussing the significance of a patentee's definitions within a patent license where a purchaser
raises the defense of having an implied license).

2020]

FRANCHISE PARTICIPANTS AS PATENT OPPONENTS

531

use the invention patented by its franchisee. 126 Further issues may
arise because many franchise agreements provide to franchisees not
just the authority to use the franchisor's name and trademark but also
the right to use or otherwise make the most of the franchisor's
patents. 127 When a franchisor or franchisee applies for a patent, the
patent could be challenged for allegedly having been in actual use prior
to the filing of the patent application, especially if the franchise
program has been operating for a while. 128 A valid patent cannot be
obtained for an invention already in public use or sold over a year before
the filing of a patent application. 129
Inherent in the franchise structure is a grant of a license from
the franchisor to the franchisee. 130 A trademark licensee may not sue
the owner of the mark for infringement, as the trademark owner itself
has specifically granted the licensee a right to utilize the trademark. 131
Moreover, similar to how a franchisor may impliedly grant a trademark
license to a franchisee, the same is true for patents as well. A patent
confers upon the patentee a "bundle of rights," and a patentee may
choose to transfer any number of those rights to a licensee or assignee,
such as a franchisee. 132 Additionally, although franchisees may have an
implied license to use a franchisor's patents, this license would probably
terminate with the franchise agreement. Such is the case in trademark
law, where termination of a franchise agreement effectively ends the

126.
Note that for goodwill, trademarks, and other such property interests, the franchisor
tends to own whatever emanates therefrom, even if the franchisee contributed to the development
of those property interests. See Emerson, supra note 105, at 357, 357 nn.36-37 (noting that, in
almost all franchise agreements, "the franchisor sets forth for itself an ownership stake extending
to all emanations from the original goodwill, even though the new franchisee may have developed
a new idea or interest"). For example, "The Big Mac@, Filet-O-Fish@ and Bacon & Egg McMuffin@
have all been developed from ideas generated by [McDonalds] franchisees around the world." Id.
Other local McDonald's products, such as the kiwi burger in New Zealand, also originated from
franchisee efforts. See id. Patents and copyrights are specifically not mentioned. See id.
127.
Madson, supra note 122, at 109.
128.
Gurnick, supra note 125, at 369.
129.
This "on-sale bar" prohibits a patent if the matter sought to be patented was sold, or
at least offered for sale, more than one year before a patent application was filed. 35 U.S.C § 102(a)
(2018). In other words, there is a one-year grace period to file for a patent after a sale or offer for
sale of that which was invented. An offer's or sale's earliest date is the critical date for starting the
year and is often referred to as the "statutory bar date."
See Gurnick, supra note 125, at 370-71.
130.
131.
Westowne Shoes, Inc. v. Brown Grp., Inc., 104 F.3d 994, 997 (7th Cir. 1997).
132.
Abate & Morten, supranote 77, at 488.
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right of the franchisee to use the franchisor's trademarks. 133 A licensee,
however, is not estopped from challenging the validity of a patent.134
V. THE FRANCHISEE AS DIRECT OR INDIRECT PURCHASER

The standing requirements for Walker Process claims do not
differ much from standing requirements in more conventional antitrust
actions. 135 However, direct purchasers filing Walker Process claims can
still have standing even if they would not have had standing for
challenging the validity of the patent in the first place. In 2012, the
Ninth Circuit in Ritz Camera was the first to decide that direct
purchasers have standing to bring Walker Process claims. 136 Three
years earlier, the Second Circuit in In re DDAVP expressly declined to
rule on the issue of standing but recognized the "lack of binding
precedent" with regard to the specific issue of whether purchaser
plaintiffs have standing to assert a Walker Process claim. 1 37 In other
contexts, if the parties do not have any form of Walker Process claim
(e.g., an infringement suit counterclaim), then a patent's validity can be
challenged only by a party (1) that is producing or preparing to produce
the patented product, and (2) is being threatened or is reasonably likely
to be threatened with an infringement suit. 1 38

A. Conventional Antitrust Actions: Illinois Brick
In conventional antitrust actions, the commonly used test for
antitrust standing is whether the plaintiff is "within the area of the
economy which is endangered by a breakdown of competitive conditions

133.
See McDonaldis Corp. v. Robertson, 147 F.3d 1301, 1308 (11th Cir. 1998) (stating that
a franchisee's unauthorized use of the franchisor's trademark requires the proper termination of
the franchise agreement); 7-Eleven, Inc. v. Dhaliwal, No. 12-CV-02276-KJM-GGH, 2012 WL
5880462, at *6-7 (E.D. Cal. Nov. 21, 2012); Wetzel's Pretzels, LLC v. Johnson, 797 F. Supp. 2d
1020, 1025, 1028 (C.D. Cal. 2011) (finding that defendant's use of plaintiffs trademark was
unauthorized since the franchise agreement terminated).
134.
Lear, Inc. v. Adkins, 395 U.S. 653, 674 (1969). More recent cases have teased out the
ambiguities left by Lear and no decision has yet settled these issues. See Span-Deck, Inc. v.
Fab-Con, Inc., 677 F.2d 1237, 1240 (8th Cir. 1982); Mayo Clinic Jacksonville v. Alzheimer's Inst.
of Am., Inc., 683 F. Supp. 2d 1292, 1298 (M.D. Fla. 2009).
135.
Molecular Diagnostics Labs. v. Hoffmann-La Roche Inc., 402 F. Supp. 2d 276, 281
(D.D.C. 2005).
136.
See supra PartIII.
137.
In re DDAVP Direct Purchaser Antitrust Litig., 585 F.3d 677, 684 (2d Cir. 2009); see
also supra text accompanying notes 82, 95, 97.
138.
See, e.g., In re DDAVP, 585 F.3d at 690; Cordis Corp. v. Medtronic, Inc., 835 F.2d 859,
862 (Fed. Cir. 1987).
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in a particular industry." 139 The federal antitrust statutes do not
explicitly make a distinction between direct and indirect purchasers. 140
It was the Supreme Court that created the bar against indirect
purchasers in two cases: Hanover Shoe, Inc. v. United Shoe Machinery
Corp. and Illinois Brick Co. v. Illinois.1 4 1 Because of these cases, the
antitrust suits are limited to those who first purchased from the patent
holder. 142 The reasoning behind barring other claimants is that
consumers and others further down the line suffer damages that are
less easily quantifiable and therefore introduce even more uncertainty
in terms of their pursuing potential treble damages awards in federal
court. 1 4 3 The decision in Illinois Brick means that not only are
individual indirect consumers barred from recovery but also that larger
indirect purchasers (i.e., small businesses) are unable to recover for the
significant harm suffered from ordering in bulk.1 44 However, the
Supreme Court held that Illinois Brick does not preempt state laws that
specifically grant indirect purchasers the right to sue, and, in fact, state
courts have largely chosen not to follow the rule of Illinois Brick.14 5 As
a result, many indirect purchasers file suit in state courts while direct
purchasers file suit in federal court.14 6
Still, given the federal availability of treble damages and the
ability of direct purchasers to pass on overcharges to indirect
purchasers, federal standing is highly valuable.14 7 On the other hand,

139.
William H. Page, The Scope ofLiabilityfor Antitrust Violations, 37 STAN. L. REV. 1445,
1446-47 (1985) (discussing similarities and differences between antitrust standing and injury
requirements).
140.
15 U.S.C. § 2 (2018); 15 U.S.C. § 15 (2018).
141.
392 U.S. 481(1968) (prohibiting defendants from claiming the affirmative defense that
plaintiffs passed on overcharges to customers); 431 U.S. 720 (1977) (prohibiting plaintiffs from
bringing suits if the damages resulted from the supplier passing on the overcharges).
142.
See Ill. Brick Co., 431 U.S. at 733-35; Hanover Shoe, 392 U.S. at 494.
143.
Ill. Brick Co., 431 U.S. at 735.
144.
Id.; see United States v. Microsoft Corp., 87 F. Supp. 2d 30, 49 (D.D.C. 2000), aff'd in
part and rev'd in part, 253 F.3d 34 (D.C. Cir. 2001). In the Microsoft case, the court found that
Microsoft used its market power to charge inflated prices for Windows, effectively stifling
competition. See Microsoft, 87 F. Supp. 2d 30, 49. Immediately after the case, plaintiffs filed civil
suits seeking damages for antitrust claims; however, courts dismissed the complaints, stating that
indirect purchasers cannot seek treble damages under IllinoisBrick. See id.
145.
Matthew M. Duffy, Chipping Away at the Illinois Brick Wall: Expanding Exceptions
to the IndirectPurchaserRule, 87 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1709, 1719 (2012).

146.
Id. at 1726.
147.
In economics and in antitrust law, an "overcharge"-which can result, in legal terms,
to an "overcharge injury"-is "the price increment caused by the anticompetitive conduct that
originated or augmented the monopolist's control over the market." Berkey Photo, Inc. v. Eastman
Kodak Co., 603 F.2d 263, 297 (2d Cir. 1979). In simpler terms, the Second Circuit refers to an
overcharge as being the amount of what was paid to a violator of section 2 of the Sherman Act
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most state "Illinois Brick repealer" statutes cap damage awards to
indirect purchasers in some manner. 14 8 Other states only allow the state
attorney general to bring antitrust claims on behalf of the indirect
purchaser, and some of these states can funnel the damage awards into
state funds rather than awarding them to the injured parties.14 9
Finally, some states still do not recognize the standing of indirect
purchasers to bring claims, or these states limit the standing in some
other way. 150 Thus, the distinction between direct and indirect
purchasers is exceedingly important.
B. The Clayton Act, "Efficient Enforcer" Factors, and Antitrust Injuries
To pursue a conventional antitrust claim, the purported patent
infringer must be a proper plaintiff within the meaning of section 4 of
the Clayton Act and in light of four "efficient enforcer" factors. The four
factors are
(1) the directness or indirectness of the plaintiffs asserted injury;
(2) the plaintiffs membership in an identifiable class of persons
whose self-interest would normally motivate them to vindicate
the public interest in antitrust enforcement;
(3) the speculative nature of the plaintiffs alleged injury; and
(4) the difficulty of identifying damages and apportioning them
among direct and indirect victims so as to avoid duplicative
recoveries.151

The purpose of this test is to narrow the scope of the statute so that
suits cannot simply be brought by "any person who has been harmed by

insofar as it "exceeds that which would have been charged in the absence of anticompetitive
action." Id. at 298.
148.
See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 6-5-60(a) (2014) (allowing recovery of actual damages plus a sum
of $500); IOWA CODE § 553.12(2)-(3) (2015) (allowing recovery of actual damages plus
exemplary damages at the court's discretion upon a finding of willful or flagrant conduct); MIss.
CODE ANN. § 75-21-9 (2016) (allowing recovery of actual damages plus a sum of $500). But see CAL.
Bus. & PROF. CODE § 16750(a) (West 2018) (allowing treble damages).
149.
See, e.g., ALASKA STAT. § 45.50.577(a) (2017) (allowing the attorney general to bring a
claim on behalf of an injured party and allowing for damages to be deposited in the general fund
at court's discretion); ARK. CODE ANN. § 4-75-315(a) (2011) (allowing attorney general to recover
up to $1,000 in damages on behalf of injured party).
See, e.g., N.Y. GEN. BUS. LAW § 340(6) (McKinney 2018) (allowing indirect purchaser
150.
claims but requiring courts to take necessary steps to "avoid duplicate liability").
151.
Gatt Commc'ns, Inc. v. PMC Assocs., L.L.C., 711 F.3d 68, 78 (2d Cir. 2013); see
Associated Gen. Contractors of Cal., Inc. v. Cal. State Council of Carpenters, 459 U.S. 519,
540-45 (1983) (discussing the four elements).
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anti-competitive conduct, however remotely or indirectly." 1 52 The test,
however, does not require finding "the ideal plaintiff, nor the
most altruistic one, nor the one most grievously injured by the
anti-competitive conduct." 153 The "efficient enforcer" factors are
nonexclusive, and no particular factor is more important than the
others.15 4
Although the Clayton Act does not restrict its protections to
consumers or purchasers, it is evident that direct purchasers, when
they have paid higher prices to the patentee because of the illegal
monopoly, may be the preferred plaintiffs for such claims.1 55 This
preference arises "[b]ecause protecting consumers from monopoly prices
is the central concern of antitrust," and, "[a]s a result, consumer[s']
standing to recover for an overcharge paid directly to an illegal cartel
or monopoly is seldom doubted." 15 6 In fact, in Molecular Diagnostic
Labs. v. Hoffman-La Roche, a doctrinal case granting direct purchaser
standing, the court stated that "because direct purchasers have
frequent interactions with the [monopolizing] defendants, they have a
strong incentive to discover and litigate the offense." 15 7 In Molecular
Diagnostic Labs., a direct purchaser of a patented drug filed a Walker
Process claim on the grounds that, due to the patent holders'
enforcement of a fraudulently obtained patent, the purchaser had to
pay an artificially inflated price for the patented drug. 158 The patent
holders moved to dismiss the action on the grounds that the direct
purchasers lack standing. However, the court denied the patent holders'

152.
Daniel v. Am. Bd. of Emergency Med., 428 F.3d 408, 450 (2d Cir. 2005) (stating that
Associated General Contractors of California, Inc. u. CaliforniaState Council of Carpenters offers
no guidance as to how many factors must weigh against a plaintiff in order to find that a Clayton
Act remedy is precluded or as to which factors are most important).
153.
Id.
154.
Associated Gen. Contractors,459 U.S. at 537.
155.
In re Netflix Antitrust Litig., 506 F. Supp. 2d 308, 316 (N.D. Cal. 2007) (recognizing
that harm accrues directly to consumers and concluding that consumers have standing only if they
can plead all other elements of a Walker Process claim). Courts have been reluctant to find that
direct purchasers have standing to bring Walker Process claims unless a patent had "already been
held unenforceable due to inequitable conduct." In re DDAVP Direct Purchaser Antitrust Litig.,
585 F.3d 677, 691-92 (2d Cir. 2009).
156.

2 PHILLIP E. AREEDA & HERBERT HOVENKAMP, ANTITRUST LAW

¶

345, at 356 (2d ed.

2000); see also Ill. Brick Co. v. Illinois, 431 U.S. 720, 734-35 (1977) (recognizing that antitrust laws
will be effectively enforced by "concentrating the full recovery for the overcharge in the direct
purchasers").
Molecular Diagnostics Labs. v. Hoffmann-La Roche Inc., 402 F. Supp. 2d 276, 281
157.
(D.D.C. 2005) (recognizing that competitor plaintiffs will generally have limited contact
with defendants unless there is some suspicion of infringement by the defendant against the
competitor).
158.
Id. at 278.
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motion and found that "there is little reason to think that standing
requirements for Walker Process claims differ from standing
requirements in more conventional antitrust action."159 In fact, the
Federal Trade Commission and the Department of Justice have taken
the position that broad consumer standing for Walker Process claims is
appropriate. 160
C. Antitrust Injuries and Franchising
Antitrust injuries that have an effect on franchisees can be
recognized as an antitrust injury to the franchisor. A prime example is
found in Mytee Products, Inc. v. Harris Research, Inc. 16 1 There, Harris
Research moved for a permanent injunction against Mytee after the
court found that Mytee's products had infringed on Harris's patents for
liquid extraction nozzles used in carpet cleaning. 162 The court granted
a permanent injunction against Mytee because Harris provided the
extraction nozzles to its franchisees and the franchisees relied on the
nozzles for a competitive advantage in the market. 163 Since the nozzles
enhanced liquid extraction from carpets, they were undoubtedly very
valuable to franchisees operating carpet-cleaning businesses. Thus,
taking away the patent protection would cause irreparable harm to
franchisees from the resulting indirect competition. 164 Further, not only
did the infringement affect Harris's franchisees but the court also held
that it caused irreparable damage to Harris as the franchisor, because
the "patented technology was almost exclusively used by its franchisee"
and its franchisees used the nozzles as the primary tools for their
businesses. 165 Similarly, in U.S. HorticulturalSupply, Inc. v. Scotts Co.,
distributor US Horticultural sufficiently alleged an antitrust violation
by the manufacturer, Scotts, when Scotts refused to renew US
Horticultural's distributorship for Scotts's fertilizer product. 166 Scotts's
decision came after US Horticultural rebuffed Scotts's demand that US

159.
Id. at 281, 289.
160.
See Brief for the United States & the FTC as Amici Curiae in Support of Appellee at
6, Ritz Camera & Image, LLC v. SanDisk Corp., 700 F.3d 503 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (No. 12-1183).
However, it is important to recognize that this may no longer hold true under the current
administration.
161.
Mytee Prods., Inc. v. Harris Research, Inc., 439 F. App'x 882 (Fed. Cir. 2011).
162.
Id. at 885.
163.
Id. at 884-85.
164.
Id. at 885.
165.
Id. at 888.
166.
U.S. Horticultural Supply, Inc. v. Scotts Co., 367 F. App'x 305 (3d Cir. 2010).
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Horticultural cease selling a fertilizer product of J.R. Peters Company,
a competitor of Scotts. 167

Thus, while patents are typically an exception to the general
antitrust rule prohibiting monopolization,
suits to counter
anticompetitive and arguably invalid patents can proceed on behalf of
franchisees. A lawfully obtained patent allows the patentee to preclude
others in the market from using the patented product regardless of the
monopolization effects thereof. 168 The antitrust injuries arise when the
patent is illegally procured or illegally used to restrain other
competitors in the market. Such injuries include, inter alia, a
monopolist's use of licensing to increase a rival's costs, a monopolist's
attempted enforcement of its fraudulently procured and invalid patent
against would-be competitors, and communications to customers
threatening infringement suits. 169 After proving that an injury
occurred, the claimant-infringer must prove that the claimed injury is
sufficiently direct. To assess the directness of the injury, the court
"look[s] to the chain of causation between [the patent infringer's] injury
and the alleged restraint in the market." 170
In conventional antitrust claims, whether a person has standing
as a direct or indirect purchaser depends on the state and the court
where the suit has been filed. After getting past standing, courts have
four factors to consider for whether someone is a proper plaintiff within
the meaning of section 4 of the Clayton Act (and thus is able to pursue
a conventional antitrust claim). Antitrust injuries to franchisees may
also be considered injuries to the franchisor, and, as such, a franchisor
can bring a suit on behalf of its franchisees.

167.
U.S. Horticultural Supply, Inc. v. Scotts Co., No. 03-773, 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
11859, at *19-21 (E.D. Pa. Feb. 18, 2004). Ultimately, the distributor lost on other grounds. U.S.
Horticultural Supply, 367 F. App'x at 312 (affirming summary judgment for Scotts because the
plaintiff-distributor's evidence of relevant product and geographic markets failed to address
adequately the behavior of buyers).
168.
OWNERS

OLIFF & BERRIDGE, PLC, SPECIAL REPORT: CUSTOMERS MAY BE ABLE TO SUE PATENT
FOR

ANTITRUST

DAMAGES

IN

CASES

OF

FRAUD

ON

THE

USPTO

1

(2009),

http://www.oliff.com/wp-content/uploads/2009/1 1/Customers-May-be-Able-to-Sue-Patent-Owners2.pdf [https://perma.cc/NC2B-CUAN].
169.
Bourns, Inc. v. Raychem Corp., 331 F.3d 704, 714 (9th Cir. 2003) (Pregerson, J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part); see Christopher R. Leslie, The Anticompetitive Effects
of Unenforced Invalid Patents, 91 MINN. L. REV. 101, 103-04, 112, 125 (2006) ("The fear of
infringement litigation can deter entry into the monopolist's market, even if the potential
competitor strongly believes that the patent at issue is invalid. Invalid patents can also increase
entry costs by compelling rivals to research the patent's validity, to attempt to design around the
patent, or to pay (unnecessary) licensing fees.").
170.
Am. Ad Mgmt., Inc. v. Gen. Tel. Co. of Cal., 190 F.3d 1051, 1058 (9th Cir. 1999).
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VI. MOVING TOWARD ENHANCED FRANCHISEE, NOT JUST FRANCHISOR,
STANDING

This Article recommends an approach wherein both the
franchisee and the franchisor may pursue Walker Process claims. The
franchisee or, at the very least, the franchisee association acting on the
franchisee's behalf171 should be granted the authority to pursue these
claims upon suffering an antitrust injury under the Clayton Act. 172 In
addition, franchisors, besides having the right to sue for their own
injuries, should also be able to file suit on behalf of their franchise
network. In the general antitrust context, it appears the franchisor can
file a representative suit or class action on behalf of its franchisees as
long as it has not engaged in conduct similar to the defendant's alleged
behavior. If the franchisor has engaged in similar conduct, it could serve
as the basis for franchisee grievances against the franchisor. 17 3

A. Standing in Representative Suits
A representative suit may be brought under the Federal Rules
of Civil Procedure where "the claims or defenses of the representative
parties are typical of the claims or defenses of the class; and the
representative parties fairly and adequately protect the interests of the
class."17 4 As expected, a key issue in franchisor-franchisee
representative actions is whether the franchisor and its claims or
defenses satisfy this test-that is, whether the franchisor fairly
represents the franchisees' interests with claims or defenses typical of
See Robert W. Emerson, Franchisingand the Collective Rights of Franchisees, 43
171.
VAND. L. REV. 1503, 1556 (1990). There have been proposals to accord franchisee associations more
power, such as for negotiating with the franchisor. However, the law remains weak. See Robert
W. Emerson & Uri Benoliel, Can Franchisee Associations Serve as a Substitute for Franchisee
Protection Laws?, 118 PENN ST. L. REV. 99, 128 (2013) (concluding that "policymaker reliance on
independent franchisee associations as a control against franchisor opportunism should be
reassessed," and instead legislatures should strongly consider enactment of franchisee protection
laws); Emerson, supra, at 1556-57 ("[F]ranchisee association protection statutes only ban
franchise agreements that prohibit franchisees from joining franchise associations; they accord no
affirmative powers to those associations, nor do they make it explicitly unlawful for a
franchisor to retaliate against franchisees who establish such an association."). Franchisee
association-to-franchisor collective bargaining remains unusual, with the franchisor holding the
power as a matter of law and practice. Emerson & Benoliel, supra, at 112-13; see Rupert M.
Barkoff, Collective Bargainingin FranchiseEnvironments, N.Y. L.J., Nov. 17, 2010, at 3.
172.
Franchise participants have a number of chances to claim antitrust injury to satisfy
that element for each type of claim. Suits could be filed on behalf of the franchisor, its franchisees,
or, perhaps, the franchise system itself. See supra notes 62-63, 169-170 and accompanying text
(discussing antitrust injury).
173.
Plum Tree, Inc. v. Rouse Co., 58 F.R.D. 373, 373 (E.D. Pa. 1972).
174.
FED. R. Civ. P. 23(a)(3)-(4).
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the entire class. For example, in the antitrust context, in Billy Baxter,
Inc. v. Coca-Cola, Inc., the franchisor sued on behalf of its franchisees
under the Sherman Act, the Clayton Act, and the Robinson-Patman Act,
alleging that defendants Coca-Cola and Canada Dry restrained
competition by agreeing not to engage in legitimate competition with
each other.1 75 The franchisor's supposedly representative suit
ultimately failed because the franchisor's business was not within the
"target area" of the alleged wrongdoing and only suffered indirect
damage, unlike the franchisees' businesses.1 7 6 These standing
challenges have been analogized to those faced by a nonoperating lessor
alleging antitrust injuries on behalf of its lessee or by a patent holder
bringing claims for antitrust violations directed toward its licensees.1 77
However, the standing issues faced by franchisors in general
antitrust representative suits may be more easily overcome by
franchisors bringing Walker Process violations. Underlying every
Walker Process claim against a fraudulently procured patent is the
patent holder's allegation that the Walker Process claimant is engaged
in patent infringement and therefore requires an extraordinarily priced
license to engage in continued business operations. When a patent
holder brings such a claim against a franchisee or franchisees, the
purported patent infringement is directed toward the very heart of the
franchise system and attacks the legality of the franchisor's franchise
network directly. In other words, it calls into question whether the
franchisor may grant certain franchise rights. 178 This is because a

175.
Billy Baxter, Inc. v. Coca-Cola Co., 431 F.2d 183, 185-86, 189 (2d Cir. 1970) (affirming
district court's grant of summary judgment where the franchisor-plaintiff lacked standing to
represent a class of franchisees).
176.
Id. at 187.
177.
SCM Corp. v. Radio Corp. of Am., 407 F.2d 166 (2d Cir. 1969); Plum Tree, 58 F.R.D.
at 376 (citing Calderone Enters. Corp. v. United Artists Theatre Circuit, Inc., 454 F.2d 1292 (2d
Cir. 1971)).
178.
Walker Process claims are, at their core, patent claims. "The far-reaching social and
economic consequences of a patent, therefore, give the public a paramount interest in seeing that
patent monopolies spring from backgrounds free from fraud or other inequitable conduct and that
such monopolies are kept within their legitimate scope." See, e.g., Walker Process Equip., Inc. v.
Food Mach. & Chem. Corp., 382 U.S. 177 (1965) (quoting Precision Instrument Mfg. Co. v. Auto.
Maint. Mach. Co., 324 U.S. 806, 816 (1945); In re DDAVP Direct Purchaser Antitrust Litig., 585
F.3d 677, 689-90 (2d Cir. 2009)). Because of the importance of intellectual property-and
increasingly, patents-within the franchise distribution system, franchisors, franchisees, and
franchise systems in general are ideal plaintiffs for Walker Process claims. See Francis J. Duffin
& Bryan S. Watson, Best Practicesin Protectingand Enforcing Trademarks, Copyrights, and Other
Intellectual Property Rights, 28 FRANCHISE L.J. 132, 132 (2009) ("Intellectual property may well
be a franchise systems most important asset."); Madson, supra note 122, at 108 (discussing the
implications of increasing patent licensing in franchise agreements); Gregory Rosenblatt,
Christina K. Peterson & Jody Lynn DeStefanis, A Sleeping Tiger? Business Method Patent
Protection for Franchise Systems, 22 FRANCHISE L.J. 9, 10 (2002) (citing franchise systems that
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franchised network of businesses allows a franchisor to acquire local
expertise and rapidly penetrate local markets by granting franchisees
a "license" of sorts to utilize the franchise system's goodwill, including
the know-how and intellectual property rights developed by the
franchisor. 179

B. FranchisorsProsecutingWalker Process Claims for Franchise
Network Protection
The franchisor should be able to prosecute Walker Process claims
as a means of network protection. It is likely that franchisors and
franchisees have standing to bring such claims since they are treated
similarly to those businesses with nonfranchise relationships.18 0
However, one hurdle to overcome will be the separate standards under
which franchisors and franchisees are reviewed. Antitrust law often
involves satisfying the rule of reason. 181 Without more than a 25 percent
market share, it will be difficult for a franchisor to establish a violation
of this rule under section 1 of the Sherman Act (unreasonable restraints
on trade). 182
This is important because vertical restraints, such as
relationships between franchisors and franchisees, are generally judged
under the rule of reason. For standing purposes, the franchisor-being
harmed directly, rather than just indirectly-will have the same injury
as its franchisee. The franchisor's interests in defending against
patent infringement or preventing enforcement of a fraudulently
obtained patent will likewise align with its franchisee(s).
Moreover, a franchisee's-or multiple franchisees'-involvement in
patent-infringement litigation threatens the goodwill of the franchise
system, which the franchisor, as the ultimate owner of such goodwill,
has a right to protect. 183
use business-method patents). A franchise system with patents as part of its suite of intellectual
property rights would certainly be directly harmed by a patent troll. Walker Process standing is an
ideal remedy.
179.
Emerson, supra note 106, at 781 (evaluating franchise encroachment considerations
in the context of the general business community); see Robert W. Emerson, Franchise
Encroachment, 47 Am. BUS. L.J. 191, 195 (2010) (noting that the franchise network provides local
expertise and rapid market penetration "while permitting the franchisee to latch onto the national
name recognition, marketing, and goodwill of a larger business").
180.
Kay Lynn Brumbaugh & Michael K. Lindsey, Antitrust Law, in FUNDAMENTALS OF
FRANCHISING 233, 240 (Rupert M. Barkoff et al. eds., 4th ed. 2015).
181.
The rule of reason requires the plaintiff to prove that a challenged practice has or is
likely to have a substantial adverse effect on competition in a relevant market. Id. at 238.
182.
See Assam Drug Co. v. Miller Brewing Co., 798 F.2d 311, 318 n.18 (8th Cir. 1986).
See generally Emerson, supra note 105 (discussing the interactions of franchise
183.
goodwill and terminations of the franchise relationship).

2020]

FRANCHISE PARTICIPANTS AS PATENT OPPONENTS

541

A franchisor, acting on behalf of its franchisees and franchise
system, may also be a proper plaintiff within the meaning of section 4
of the Clayton Act and in light of the four "efficient enforcer" factors
discussed above.18 4 As already identified, a franchisor's asserted injury
will be direct, rather than indirect, and will not be speculative.
Additionally, duplicative recovery and litigation can be avoided if a
franchisor is required to represent the rights of its franchisees,
improving judicial efficiency. Lastly, franchisor self-interest in
protecting the franchise system is greater than consumer self-interest
and will be a sufficient motivating factor to pursue Walker Process
claims, thereby vindicating public interest in antitrust enforcement.
Due to the amount at stake for the franchise system,
franchisor-plaintiffs are less likely to be deterred from pursuing
legitimate
patent-validity
challenges by accepting licensing
arrangements or settlement agreements. By way of a hypothetical
scenario, a franchisor could stunt a patent holder's ability to extort
individual franchisees through repetitious threats and litigation by
defending the franchise system's rights in a single Walker Process
action. A franchisor with its deeper pockets is more likely to defend the
franchise system's rights than a franchisee, as a patent lawsuit, which
on average results in legal fees ranging between $700,000 and $5
million, 185 is likely to bankrupt the franchisee's operations. At the very
least, a franchise may be less likely to settle simply because of the
enormous amount it can gain from patent invalidation and the
numerous options it potentially has for claims and standing.
Additionally, many of the standing issues faced by consumers in
maintaining Walker Process claims will not arise for franchise
participants bringing such claims. In cases brought by consumer
plaintiffs, often an issue critical to ascertaining standing is whether a
consumer paid a monopoly overcharge to the monopolist. 186 However,

184.
Associated Gen. Contractors of Cal., Inc. v. Cal. State Council of Carpenters, 459 U.S.
519, 544 (1983).
185.
LAW PRACTICE MGMT. COMM., AM. INTELLECTUAL PROP. LAW ASS'N, REPORT OF THE
ECONOMIC SURVEY 34 (2013).

See Christopher R. Leslie, New Possibilitiesfor Asserting Walker Process Claims, 21
186.
ANTITRUST 48, 50 n. 24 (2007) (discussing the lack of clarity with respect to consumer standing to
bring Walker Process litigation). An example of such overcharges would be, in the Walker Process
case itself, the monopolist charge of $150 per unit of the patent holder's sewage treatment aeration
equipment while the patent was in effect, but only $50 after the patent expired. Leslie, supra note
169, at 119. This is distinguishable from a question of the business's profits or losses. After
accounting for a presumed markup of 10 percent on the price of the items, the monopoly profits
realized would amount to $105 per unit, as opposed to the nonmonopoly losses of $5 per unit.
Christopher R. Leslie, The Role of Consumers in Walker Process Litigation, 13 Sw. J.L. & TRADE
AM. 281, 293 (2008).
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franchise participant claims will be more akin to those of competitors
who are charged with allegedly infringing upon the patent holder's
rights, which is an easier bar to meet.
C. Fighting Trolling and Sham Litigation
A franchisor's challenge of an invalid patent will avoid disputes
within the franchise system should a franchisee seek indemnification
from the franchisor for licensing payments or royalties. In that case, it
may actually be less expensive for a franchise to go ahead and challenge
the patent at issue rather than having to purchase licensing rights for
every potentially infringing franchisee. Even if the franchise's case is
looking bleak, it likely could still fall back on a settlement with the
patent holder to protect the interests of franchisees. Therefore, the
franchisee will either acquire a license to use the patent, or it will be
free from any patent infringement due to invalidation.
There are, of course, concerns that a grant of broad Walker
Process claim rights, as proposed in this Article, would lead to an
outbreak of "reverse" sham litigation, whereby Walker Process plaintiffs
(i.e., franchisors and franchisees) "cry wolf' that a patent has been
obtained by virtue of fraud on the USPTO at heightened rates, despite
lacking a sufficient basis for a belief that such fraud occurred. However,
the barriers presently surrounding Walker Process claims ensure that
"reverse" sham litigation cannot thrive. With difficult-to-satisfy
requirements of intent and causation, there exists a robust balance of
barriers and broad standing, impediments to successful fraud
allegations combined with encouragement to file Walker Process
claims. 187 As an initial matter, Walker Process claims are extremely
difficult to plead and to prove due to the heightened level of inequitable
conduct and proof of intent required. Scholars have concluded that
successful Walker Process claims are "few and far between"-most
claims are dismissed on summary judgment due to an inability to prove
that the patent holder's inequitable conduct amounted to fraud on the
USPTO. 188 This is often due to the statutory presumption of validity
afforded patent holders, which a challenger must rebut by clear and

187.
See supra Section IIA; see also supra notes 48, 57.
See supra Section IIA; see also Giuliano v. SanDisk Corp., 224 F. Supp. 3d 851 (N.D.
188.
Cal. 2016), aff'd sub nom. Giulianov. SanDisk LLC, 705 F. App'x 957, 960 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (denying
a Walker Process claim where the alleged patent infringer could not show intent on behalf of the
patent holder to deceive the USPTO); Dippin' Dots, Inc. v. Mosey, 476 F.3d 1337, 1346 (Fed. Cir.
2007) (reversing a successful Walker Process claim where the patent holder's inequitable conduct
did not amount to fraudulent behavior).
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convincing evidence in order to shift the burden. 189 Moreover, a patent
holder's "good faith" or "honest mistake" during the patent application
process will provide a complete defense to Walker Process claims.1 90
With the high litigation costs and attorneys' fees associated with
antitrust litigation, plaintiffs have little incentive to pursue frivolous
litigation. 19 1
Additionally, the potential for abuse is lessened in view of
federal courts' authority to sanction frivolous or baseless lawsuits under
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. 1 92 Under Rule 11, the signature of
an attorney or party constitutes a certificate by the signer that to the
best of the signer's knowledge, information, and belief, formed after
reasonable inquiry, the suit is well grounded in fact and is warranted
by existing law or a good-faith argument for the extension, modification,
or reversal of existing law. 193 An attorney's or party's failure to first
conduct this reasonable inquiry may serve as a basis for the court's
imposition of sanctions against the culpable party, attorney, or law
firm, or all of the above, to deter baseless filings by the parties in the

189.
Microsoft Corp. v. i4i Ltd. P'ship, 564 U.S. 91, 97 (2011); Am. Hoist & Derrick Co. v.
Sowa & Sons, Inc., 725 F.2d 1350, 1359-60 (Fed. Cir. 1984).
190.
Walker Process Equip., Inc. v. Food Mach. & Chem. Corp., 382 U.S. 177, 177 (1965).
191.
Where meritless claims are a real concern-such as in the emotional-distress
context-the pleading standards and burdens of proof often favor the party bringing the claims, at
least at the early stages of litigation. Compare Eagle-Picher Indus., Inc. v. Cox, 481 So. 2d 517,
528 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1985) (refusing to allow a claim for emotional distress where the distress
was caused by the plaintiffs fear of contracting cancer after contact with asbestos, because
allowing such claims would open the floodgates to meritless claims and would have a destructive
impact on the industry), with Molien v. Kaiser Found. Hosps., 616 P.2d 813, 923 (Cal. 1980)
(allowing husband to bring an emotional-distress claim against a hospital that misdiagnosed his
wife's disease). In California, an emotional distress plaintiff can defeat a motion to dismiss and
then force a settlement with a party who would rather avoid a costly trial; this could incentivize
meritless claims. Florida courts chose to avoid this dilemma by barring certain types of
emotional-distress claims altogether. In contrast to emotional-distress claims, the incentive
structure for Walker Process claims is flipped. As mentioned above, the procedural bar to Walker
Process claims is extremely high due to the fraud requirement. Therefore, a Walker Process
plaintiff would not be able to recoup its litigation costs unless it had a meritorious claim. Meritless
claims are dismissed, not settled. See Eagle-PicherIndus., 481 So. 2d at 528.
192.
Georgene Vairo, Rule 11 and the Profession, 67 FORDHAM L. REV. 589, 590 (1998). Rule
11 targets unprofessional and incompetent conduct that the bar's disciplinary processes had
previously ignored. See id.
More precisely, it created a vehicle for punishing certain kinds of conduct that were
largely unreachable or untouched before. The open judicial punishment of such attorney
conduct ultimately may help restore confidence in the profession in ways that the
generally still very private disciplinary enforcement of ethical codes do not.
Id. This raised judicial consciousness of the need to deal with abuses in the civil legal system. See

id.
193.

FED. R. Civ. P. 11(b).
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future or by similarly situated litigants.19 4 Although Walker Process
frivolous litigation is unlikely, should this abuse occur, the federal
courts would easily be able to deter such conduct. 195 Certainly, Rule 11
seems intended to combat this exact sort of abuse in the litigation
process. 196 Given the amendments to the rule, the sanctions could
logically follow the outcome of any sham litigation cases, acting as a
sort of double deterrent against frivolous suits.
The likelihood of sanctions under Rule 11 is best understood by
separating the various types of attorney misconduct into four broad
categories: (1) nonviolation (where the pleading is reasonable under the
circumstances); (2) a nonwillful, good-faith violation (where the
reasonableness standard is not met because of factors such as
incompetence, lack of experience, case complexity, and oversight); (3) a
willful, good-faith violation (where the reasonableness standard is not
met because of personally controllable factors, such as neglect or
laziness); and (4) a willful, bad-faith violation (where the
reasonableness standard is not met because of intentional disregard or
misrepresentation of the facts or law or is not met for an improper
purpose). 197 According to the 1985 publication of a Federal Judicial

194.
Bus. Guides, Inc. v. Chromatic Commc'ns Enters., Inc., 498 U.S. 533 (1991) (affirming
the lower court's imposition of sanctions against a party who signed a pleading without first
conducting a reasonable inquiry into its factual basis).
195.
DAVID RAUMA & THOMAS E. WILLGING, REPORT OF A SURVEY OF UNITED
STATES DISTRICT JUDGES' EXPERIENCES AND VIEWS CONCERNING RULE 11, FEDERAL RULES

OF CIVIL PROCEDURE 2 (2005), https://www.uscourts.gov/sites/default/files/rule1105_1.pdf
[https://perma.cc/N44U-EWBV]; Elizabeth C. Wiggins, Thomas E. Willging & Donna Stienstra,
The Federal Judicial Center's Study of Rule 11, FJC DIRECTIONS, Nov. 1991, at 3, 17-18 ("The
Advisory Committee expressed concern that the size of monetary sanctions might over-deter
lawyers, making them reluctant to assert marginally well-founded contentions for fear of a
large

sanction. . . . Relatively few orders

included non-monetary

sanctions. . . . Most of the

non-monetary sanctions were either (1) reprimands, admonitions, or warnings, or (2) prohibitions
against or conditions on future filings. Other non-monetary sanctions included dismissal of the
complaint . . . striking other documents, requiring continuing legal education, ordering production
of documents or appearance for deposition, and precluding testimony."). A 2005 survey of 400
federal district court judges, with a response rate of 69.5 percent (278 judges), found that 85
percent of judges strongly or moderately supported Rule 1I's safe-harbor provision, 91 percent
opposed the proposed requirement that every Rule 11 violation be sanctioned, 84 percent disagreed
with the proposition that an award of attorney fees should be mandatory for every Rule 11
violation, and 72 percent believed that having sanctions for discovery in Rule 26(g) and Rule 37
was best. See id. In the same study, 55 percent of judges indicated the purpose of Rule 11 should
be both deterrence and compensation, while almost all of the remaining judges (44 percent)
indicated deterrence should be the sole purpose. See RAUMA & WILLGING, supra.
196.
FED. R. CIV. P. 11 advisory committee's notes to the 1983 amendments (attempting to
expand the rule's application to litigants whose opponents act "in bad faith in instituting or
conducting litigation").
197.
SAUL M. KASSIN, AN EMPIRICAL STUDY OF RULE 11 SANCTIONS 27-28, 28 tbl.11 (1985),
https://www.fjc.gov/sites/default/files/2012/Rule llStudy.pdf [https://perma.cc/TG5C-EEXW].
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Center empirical study on Rule 11 sanctions, sanctions were awarded
in 2 percent of cases falling under the first category of misconduct, 61
percent of cases falling under the second category, 85 percent of cases
falling under the third category, and 98 percent of cases falling under
the fourth category. 198 Following the amendment of Rule 11 in 1993,
providing for a safe harbor from sanctions if a challenged contention or
other alleged 11(b) violation is quickly corrected (typically, within
twenty-one days), 199 the rule had broad support from both judges and
attorneys. 200
Having defeated existing patent troll threats surely can make a
franchise system more appealing to a prospective franchisee that is
worried about the peril of patent litigation. Alternatively, simply the
reassurance that the franchisee will be protected by the franchisor in
some form can further increase the value of the franchise system. While
patent holders may comfortably bully unorganized, smaller companies
that are unwilling to fight a patent-infringement case, a franchisor
suing on behalf of a coalition of franchisees is a lot more daunting. The
looming danger of franchises that will fight back on infringement claims
may also make patent trolls less likely to engage in the business of
utilizing patents to acquire license payments, as the monetary gain
could be too risky. Thus, the franchise system can turn the threat of
litigation back onto patent trolls themselves.
VII. CONCLUSION
Both Walker Process and sham litigation claims can have a
robust application in the franchise context. Both avenues require a
198.
Id.
199.
FED. R. Civ. P. 11(c)(2) ("A motion for sanctions ... [for Rule 11(b)
violations] . . . . must not be filed or be presented to the court if the challenged paper, claim,
defense, contention, or denial is withdrawn or appropriately corrected within 21 days after service
[of the motion] or within another time the court sets.").
200.

JOHN SHAPARD ET AL., REPORT OF A SURVEY CONCERNING RULE 11, FEDERAL RULES OF

CIVIL PROCEDURE 4-5, 4 tbl.3 (1995), https://www.fjc.gov/sites/default/files/2012/rulell.pdf
[https://perma.cc/A3LW-LGM6]. Over 70 percent of judges and 80 percent of plaintiffs' attorneys
supported the inclusion of a safe harbor provision in Rule 11 allowing for the cure of defective or
deficient pleadings, while 61 percent of defense attorneys supported the same. See id. With respect
to the standard delineated in Rule 11(b)(3), that an attorney certifies to the best of his knowledge
that "factual contentions have evidentiary support or, if specifically so identified, will likely have
evidentiary support after a reasonable opportunity for further investigation or discovery," judges
were almost evenly split, with 40 percent advocating for keeping Rule 11 as it is and 38 percent
supporting a higher standard requiring that all factual contentions have evidentiary support at
the time of filing. See id. Plaintiffs' attorneys overwhelmingly (79 percent) supported keeping Rule
11 as it is (only 12 percent for the heightened standard), while defense attorneys' preferences were
in line with the judges-45 percent supporting keeping Rule 11 as it is and 40 percent supported
the heightened standard. See id.
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showing of antitrust violation and may complement each other to create
a potent sword-and-shield arsenal for franchisees and franchisors. 2 01

Walker Process claims give both franchisors and franchisees the
opportunity to protect themselves and their franchise system from
patents procured by fraud. If franchise parties cannot meet the high
standards required to show that a patent holder defrauded the USPTO,
the franchisees or franchisor could fall back on a sham litigation claim,
which requires proof that infringement claims were objectively baseless
when the suit was filed. 2 02

In the wake of the Ritz Camera holding, franchise participants
have broad standing to bring Walker Process claims against offending
patent holders. Indeed, these franchisors or franchisees may make ideal
Walker Process claimants. Any conduct that arises to the level of
triggering such a claim is likely to be felt uniformly throughout the
entire franchise system. Thus, while an individual franchisee may be
unable to vigorously defend or pursue its rights, the uniformity of injury
allows for multiple franchisees to band together and to pool their
resources, or those of the franchisor, in the face of patent trolls or other
patent abuses.
Finally, franchisors typically have the resources to potentially
combat patent trolls. Franchisors are in a good position to challenge
anticompetitive restraints on competition-a tantalizing prospect for
small business owners and consumers-which would undoubtedly
increase the value of the franchise system. Franchise participants, both
franchisors and franchisees, could defend their networks by proving
that the troll is acting in bad faith by trying to enforce an invalid patent
or a patent that is not actually being infringed but would be very costly
to defend against in an infringement action. Additionally, the advent of
franchise Walker Process claims could be very beneficial to the business
environment and society as a whole. It would counter the almost
mandatory practice of pursuing licenses for patented technology when
that actually is not needed for, related to, or legally justified under
patent law, nor in furtherance of franchisees' or franchisors' business
activities. This new approach could foster much innovation as well as
cost savings for consumers.

201.
202.

See supra Section II.B.
See supra Section II.B.

